one has standing to object to a search of his office, as well as of his home."); United
States v. Lefkowitz, 464 F. Supp. 227, 230 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (corporate officers had
sufficient privacy interest in corporate office suite), aff'd, 618 F.2d 1313 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824, 66 L. Ed. 2d 27, 101 S. Ct. 86 (1980); see also 4 W.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.3(d) (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter LaFave]. Similarly, "it
seems clear that a corporate defendant has standing with respect to searches of
corporate premises and seizure of corporate records. . . . " Id. at 316. See G.M. Leasing
Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353, 50 L. Ed. 2d 530, 97 S. Ct. 619
(1977); Auster Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Stream, 835 F.2d 597 (5th Cir. 1988). In addition,
except in rare circumstances, a warrant is as necessary to support a search of
commercial premises as private premises. See Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v.
Castillo, 212 U.S. App. D.C. 327, 659 F.2d 1211, 1216 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(citing Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305, 98 S. Ct. 1816
(1978)), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 940, 71 L. Ed. 2d 651, 102 S. Ct. 1432 (1982).
An application of the tenets espoused in Selzner, supra, and Leary, supra, would appear
to lead to the conclusion that Phil’s Phine Cuisine, Inc., had the right to invoke the protections of
the 4
th
and 14
th
Amendments regarding the warrantless search and seizure of the “smoker list,”
which would have resulted in its exclusion and suppression.
Issue #3 – Exclusionary Rule
The final question is whether the application of the so-called “Exclusionary Rule” would
be the proper remedy for the Officer’s illegal interrogation of Mr. Smoker and seizure of the
corporate “smoker list.” In Mapp v. Ohio, supra, Justice Clark of the Supreme Court of the United
States, when delivering the Opinion of the Court, stated in part:
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by
the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise,
then, just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and
seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual
charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule, the freedom from state
invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus