one has standing to object to a search of his office, as well as of his home."); United 
States v. Lefkowitz, 464 F. Supp. 227, 230 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (corporate officers had 
sufficient  privacy  interest  in  corporate  office  suite), aff'd,  618  F.2d  1313  (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824, 66 L. Ed. 2d 27, 101 S. Ct. 86 (1980); see also 4 W. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.3(d) (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter LaFave]. Similarly, "it 
seems  clear  that  a  corporate  defendant  has  standing  with  respect  to  searches  of 
corporate premises and seizure of corporate records. . . . " Id. at 316. See G.M. Leasing 
Corp.  v.  United  States,  429  U.S.  338,  353,  50  L.  Ed.  2d  530,  97  S.  Ct.  619 
(1977); Auster Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Stream, 835 F.2d 597 (5th Cir. 1988). In addition, 
except  in  rare  circumstances,  a  warrant  is  as  necessary  to  support  a  search  of 
commercial  premises  as  private  premises. See Blackie's  House  of  Beef,  Inc.  v. 
Castillo,  212  U.S.  App.  D.C.  327,  659  F.2d  1211,  1216  n.5  (D.C.  Cir.  1981) 
(citing Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305, 98 S. Ct. 1816 
(1978)), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 940, 71 L. Ed. 2d 651, 102 S. Ct. 1432 (1982). 
 
  
  An application of the tenets espoused in Selzner, supra, and Leary, supra, would appear 
to lead to the conclusion that Phil’s Phine Cuisine, Inc., had the right to invoke the protections of 
the 4
th
 and 14
th
 Amendments regarding the warrantless search and seizure of the “smoker list,” 
which would have resulted in its exclusion and suppression.  
 Issue #3 – Exclusionary Rule 
The final question is whether the application of the so-called “Exclusionary Rule” would 
be  the  proper  remedy  for  the  Officer’s  illegal  interrogation of Mr. Smoker and seizure of  the 
corporate “smoker list.”  In Mapp v. Ohio, supra, Justice Clark of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, when delivering the Opinion of the Court, stated in part: 
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the 
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by 
the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, 
then, just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and 
seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual 
charter of inestimable human liberties, so too,  without that rule, the freedom from state 
invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus