The paper hypothesizes three things. There lacks the definitive relationship between
the CEO compensation and the performance of the firm hence triggering a possible review if
any. The governance mechanism variables are interdependent. Performance, ownership and
government structures are related, but they independently affect the compensation of the
CEO. It means therefore that governance and performance need not to be related to affect the
compensation that the corporate CEOs receive. If they do as some researchers posit then they
will always affect it in the opposite direction. To this, the conclusion of the paper is a
reflection of the research findings. However, the hypothesis falls short from the real
conclusion of the piece. The third hypothesis should have stated that the three elements are
actually not related even though they can independently affect the compensation.
Akhibe, Aigbe; Madura, Jeff. “Impact of anti-takeover amendments on corporate
performance”, Applied Financial Economics. Dec96, Vol. 6 Issue 6, p519-529. 11p.
“Impact of anti-takeover amendments on corporate performance,” by Aigbe Akhibe
and Jeff Madura is informed by the observed immediate share price changes of companies
upon the announcement of takeovers. As a result, the paper hypothesized that the general
corporate performances are always adversely affected by antitakeover amendments. Just like
the takeover of corporates that essentially leads to change in stakeholders, antitakeover
amendments to affects the corporate performances. Change in corporate controls can
sometimes be good or bad depending on the execution of the entire process. In most case, it is
accompanied by immediate adverse results prompting the need for shark repulsion.
Sometimes, it creates a conducive bargaining environment for the stakeholders with the
interested acquirers setting pace for even a higher better bargain. The negative side is that it
can easily make firms to undergo hostile acquisition. It is introduces complacency within the