How Russian leaders construct the idea of security

Running head: RUSSIAN 1
Russian- EU relationship
Student’s name
The annexation of the Crimean peninsula by Russia in 2014 together with the
undeclared combat against Ukraine was the end of the post-cold period of peace in Europe.
The conduct of Russia destroyed crucial components of both the post Cold war security
structure together with the post-WW II security structure in Europe. The actions of Russia
also contributed to the emergence of the new political division. Both Russia and the European
Union have been special actors since 1990s. Similarly, both Russia and the EU are
comparatively fresh as regional and universal security policy actors, and they are both in the
stages of formulating their exotic strategy identities though in distinct areas. Despite Russia
and the EU sharing the similarity of being new regional and universal foreign policy actors,
they have some differences in their approaches to foreign policy and political character.
Russia is habitually perceived as the global actor whose conduct effectively matches the
theoretical anticipations of the realist hypothesis while the EU is generally viewed as a post-
modernist actor perceived through the institutionalist center of global relations. Over the
years, the relationship between Russia and the EU has been more on economic development.
Nevertheless, their political relationships seemed to have deteriorated. With higher power
ambitions being the primary goal of each actor, this has made security the battleground for
regional superiority. Despite the differences in the security views of both Russia and the EU
the constructivism theory have placed a different perspective on the EU-Russia security
actors. Based on the constructivists’ views they argue that the creation of the inter-subjective
meanings amidst the two security actors may be both problematic and transformative. This
research paper, therefore, offers discussion on the application of constructivist theory to
expound the notion of security in Russia highlighting the Russia-EU relationship, especially
after the Crimean crisis.
Russian-EU relationship after the Crimean crisis
Search of international foreign policy role
The constructivist strategy draws the mind to the reflexive association of Russia and
the EU along with the changing nature of the association in the environment of flux and
identity establishment. The notion of the security in Russia highlighting the relationship
between Russia and European Union can be elaborated through the search of foreign policy
role which would be based on different civilization ideas which include westernization and
Eurasianism. Therefore the ideas are important in the search of foreign policy role through
capacitating the formation of the foreign security policy of Russia (Gowland et al., 2014,
p.189). Through the search of an international foreign policy role has enabled Russian leaders
to move from Western-oriented foreign policy to Eurasian power and then to the declaration
of the excellent power role of Russia as a supreme nation within Europe (Romanova, 2015,
p.50). The statement by the Russian leaders has shown uncertainty in the international
identity of Russia since one side of the statement marked the historical and cultural
distinctiveness of Russia alongside Russia Eurasian character while the other side of the
statements by the leaders marked the affirmation of the European choice of Russia. Likewise,
the policy identity of the European Union is also is in its formation process just as in the case
of Russia (Joenniemi, 2016, p.120). However, the formation of the coordinated foreign policy
approach has been made to be difficult by the complication of the multi-level decision-
making system of the EU along with the overall flaws of the European identity. Therefore in
the ambiance of the Russian- EU association, none of the two actors have been able to
articulate clear policy on security successfully (Gowland et al., 2014, p. 189).
The expansion of the EU has complicated the difficulty of articulating policy on both
sides due to the evolution in the nature of the EU since 2014 which has considerably
impacted on the decision-making circle of the EU. Therefore the search for a foreign policy
role on security has boosted the Russian-EU relationship through the attempt of creating a
common policy strategy that would boost their relationship. Following with the conclusion of
the PCA in 1997 capacitated the European Union to articulate a general policy strategy
towards Russia where Russia reciprocated the strategy in 2010 with the Medium-term
approach for the establishment of relationship amidst Russia and the EU (Fedorov, 2014,
p.21). Moreover, the Russian foreign policy concept defines the lasting perspective of Russia
in connection to the EU as being agreed on based on the strategic partnership pact
(Tsygankov & Francisco, 2014, p.158). Despite both Russia and the EU sharing similar
characteristics of forming and searching for a foreign policy role they have both been able to
jointly look for the standard policy strategy which would be effective for both of them as
security actors thus this has significantly boosted their relationship as new policy actors
(Hubel, 2017, p. 72). The interpretation by the realist conceptualizes Russia as being a unified
policy actor who responded to the security issues on the basis of reasonable estimation of the
national self-interest (Samokhvalov, 2018, p.795). Furthermore, Russian approaches on the
universal security matters normally envision zero-sum perceptions in terms of the
geopolitical interest within its own neighborhood. Therefore the constructivist has elaborated
the notion of security in Russia through the search for a foreign policy role which has
considerably impacted the Russia-EU relationship (DeBardeleben, 2012, p. 420).
Similarly, after the Crimean crisis of 2014, Russia-EU relationship continued to exist
since both agreed that their ties could not be broken after the crisis had ended. The global
strategy of the European Union recognized that both the EU and Russia are interdependent
(Tsygankov & Francisco, 2014, p.158). Moreover, the foreign policy of Russia stressed that
the European Union would remain to be an essential trade along with foreign policy partner
for Russia (Havlik, 2014, p.30). After the Crimean crisis, the vision of Russia to seek
strategic collaboration with the EU became less prominent in the general strategy of Russia.
The decline in the vision of Russia to seek a strategic alliance with the EU happened
drastically before the imposition of sanctions on Russia by the European Union (Fedorov et
al., 2014, p. 21). Moscow increasingly perceived the EU, which over the years has
encountered several social and political problems, as being less relevant hence based on this
perceptions, Russia's partnership with the EU appeared to be less valuable regarding
sustaining Russian international standing than the strategic convergence with China along
with other main upcoming superpowers (Havlik, 2014, p.30). Despite the EU’s unfriendly
relationship with Russia, after the Crimean crisis, their relationship with the USA has
featured much significantly in the security and strategic agenda of Moscow for several years.
Rise of fresh political landscape
Likewise, after the crisis, there was the emergence of the new political landscape in
the key members of the EU and European Union became worried about the depth of the
changes that the political landscape would impose in its relationship with Russia together
with the ultimate capacity of EU to strengthen its policy as a strategic player. Moreover, after
the crisis there was a claim that the foreign policy and security policy of Russia was
motivated by the benign vision of the European Union. However, the claim was refuted after
the creation of the new policy concept of Russia which acknowledged that the methodical
problems in the Euro-Atlantic area that are exhibited in the geopolitical advancement pursued
by the NATO and EU together with the decline of the EU to start executing political
statements pertaining the establishment of a general European security is what contributed
towards strengthening of the Russian security policy (Gowland et al., 2014, p.189). The
containment policy acquired by the USA and its associates in the European Union members
against Russia imposed political pressure, economic pressure together with informational
pressure on Russia which considerably impacted Russia through undermining its regional and
international stability in terms of security hence impacting the Russia security strategy by
causing instability near the border of Russia (Fedorov et al., 2016, p. 1502).
Development of negative perception against EU
Furthermore, after the crisis, Russia developed negative perception towards the EU
particularly after EU being depicted by Moscow to be imposing activities that challenges the
national interest of Russia. The negative perceptions which Russia had on the EU which
deteriorated their level of the relationship was caused by Russian perception on the EU as a
kind of strategic continuation of USA and NATO which are connected with the notion of the
military challenges alongside hard security problems (Jakniūnaitė, 2015, p.73). This
perception by Russia of the EU was compounded by the idea that EU nations that are also
NATO associates have reportedly opposed the critical position of Russia on the policy of
NATO. For example, the EU members have opposed the position of Russia on the anti-
missile defense system which in turn made Russia to develop negative perception towards the
EU and its associates. Moreover, Russia was seen to be as much concerned with the universal
competition based on the rivalry systems of values together with the societal development
models (Jakniūnaitė, 2015, p.73). However, Russia perceived the EU to be a challenge
towards its concern and interest on the societal development model thus leading to the
creation of negative attitude against the EU which resultantly contributed towards the decline
in their level of relationship after the Crimean crisis in 2014.
Moreover, Putin voiced a different view from its Euro-Atlantic counterparts on
several security matters ranging from the common neighborhood with the EU to the NATO
enlargement. The Ukrainian crisis initiated in 2013 illustrated the Russian own interpretation
of stability together with stability in Europe thus significantly resulted in the condemnation of
the Russian military escalation as a response to the crisis by the EU and USA. The use of the
military moves has remained the recurrent Russian reaction to the context of crisis in Europe
(Raik, 2016, p.240). Therefore the diverse views of president Putin during and after the crisis
contributed to the establishment of the negative attitude and perception of Russia against the
EU and NATO which significantly impacted Russia-EU relationship through deteriorating
the level of the relationship which the EU and Russia enjoyed before the crisis. For example
due to the military moves which resulted because of the divergent view of Putin the Kremlin
positioned Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad in reaction to the organized anti-missile shield by
the EU and NATO and in response Russia launched a security preparedness exercise on the
border of Ukraine towards the end of the crisis (Proedrou, 2016, p.60). This has adversely
impacted on the association amidst the EU and Russia after the crisis had been called off
through enhancing the negative perception Russia had towards the EU and enhancing rivalry
amidst Russia and other EU associates like the USA (Raik, 2016, p.240).
Anti-missile defense system
Nevertheless, discomfort existed among the members about establishing the anti-
missile defense system since the system was perceived to be directed against Russia to depict
Russia as a threat to the EU. This made Russia develop the notion that the EU is against its
national interest hence it considerably lowered the relationship Russia had with the EU and
its associate states after the end of the Crimean crisis of 2014. Furthermore, the idea that
Russia should join NATO as well as participate in the missile defense system positively
impacted the relationship between Russia and the EU since it assisted in establishing an
alliance between them and their counterparts (Fedorov et al., 2016, p. 1505). Hence, it has
impulsively contributed to enhancing relations between Russia and the EU because they
could now work together to improve political stability and security through the use of the
standard system applicable by Russia and the other member states of the European Union
(Chaban et al., 2017, p.482). Therefore after the crisis idea of involvement of Russia in the
missile defense system and joining of NATO positively impacted the relationship amidst
Russia and the EU through enhancing the partnership between them as security actors
because they could now work together with the aim of enhancing security through the missile
defense system thus boosting their level of relationship.
Application of conditionality of normative convergence
Moreover, after the crisis, the principled relationship the European Union aimed for
proved to be difficult to attain in association with Russia. Conversely, the application of
conditionality and the insistence of the normative convergence have progressively produced
an adverse impact on the EU because of the negative behavior of Russia which involved
illegal conquest of Crimean peninsula hence resultantly making the relationship amidst the
Union and Russia to reach its paradoxical stage (Cierco, 2016, p.70). Therefore, Russian
negative behavior of illegitimate conquest of Crimean peninsula caused inconsistency in the
strong level of relationship with the EU and this resultantly made their relationship to reach
the paradoxical stage. Also, the Ukrainian crisis exhibited the geopolitical contest and power
play, therefore, enabling high interest and foreign policy activism of Russia to surface across
other regions which threatened Russian interest, economic presence, and political influence
(Van Elsuwege, 2013, p.30). Notwithstanding the geopolitical competition and expansion on
high interest and foreign policy activism by Russia, there was also the steady growth of the
impact on the EU (Vinokurov, 2017, p.95). Moscow effectively ignored the growing effect of
the EU in the Baltic nations, Georgia and Maldova, and it also exhibited outstanding
disregard to the fate of its fellow citizens, and it did not technically demonstrate against the
completion of the association agreement amidst the EU, Moldova, and Georgia after the end
of the Crimean crisis. The association agreement undermined the position of Russia as well
as demonstrating the limitation of the neo-imperialist strategy in describing the complication
of the association of Russia with the EU across the shared neighborhood (Vinokurov, 2017,
p.105). Besides, after the Crimean crisis the association amidst Russia and the EU changed
from being a cooperative association which both Russia and the EU enjoyed during the 1990s
to a competitive relationship. After the crisis the association that exists between Russia and
the EU was mainly based on competition over sovereignty unlike the 1990s where they
cooperatively interacted together with the primary aim of boosting security rather than
scrambling for superiority and sovereignty.
Establishment of anti-access and area-denial capabilities
Likewise, after the Crimean crisis, there was the build-up of Russian anti-access
policy and area-denial capabilities in Crimea together with the threats to deploy nuclear
weapons escalated tension amidst Russia along with the EU. The policy was created to deny
Russia access to the nuclear weapon and deployment of the weapons on the EU associates.
The increased pressure led to the renewed adversarial association as the return of the nuclear
supremacy to the European states after the Crimean crisis had been ended (Gardner, 2017,
p.150). The Russian lasting perceived hostility as well as the conventional capabilities of
NATO and their proximity to Russian heartland led to the rise of the military approach that
assigned a crucial obligation to limited nuclear strikes early in the combat as a way of
reducing NATO’s conventional dominance therefore assisting to end the conflict before
causing devastating loses to the heartland (Chaban et al., 2017, p.485). The use of the nuclear
weapons have been thought to depend on the decision made by the political leadership of
Russia since it is the leaders who decides when to deploy the nuclear weapon to the EU states
and its associates. Nonetheless, the prominence of the atomic weapons is indicative of the
nation’s perceived vulnerabilities alongside intensity of adversarial association with the EU.
Therefore after the end of the Crimean crisis, the relationship between Russia and European
countries adversely impacted since it led to the rise of the war over nuclear superiority since
both of them were competing to retain superiority over the nuclear weapons.
Constructivist theory elaborating the notion of security in Russia
The constructivist theory has adequately elaborated on the notion of the Russian
security while highlighting the relationship between Russian and the EU and their concepts
have remained to be relevant since they draw attention to the subjective meanings. In the
scenario of identity construction exists in and amidst the European Union and Russia, the
creation of the inter-subjective meanings may be both challenging and transformative, and
the distinction in the governance system amidst the EU and Russia offer a weak foundation
for inter-subjectively shared rules regulating the relationship within the two security actors.
Moreover, the contested governance system can create a further problem for communication
and problem-solving (Alatalu, 2013, p.105). For example, the communication between
Russia and the EU encompasses a multifaceted phenomenon which has made it difficult to
solve various problems due to lack of a properly established mode of communication and this
has reduced the level of active association between Russia and the EU particularly because of
the communication barriers.
Additionally, communication between Russia and all the member states of EU has
remained to be a sophisticated phenomenon since the public statement cannot always be
taken at face value and they may not envision the position of the communication on both
sides of the shared inter-subjective understanding. Nonetheless, complicated communication
phenomena act as a hindrance rather than a facilitator of problem-solving and it has
contributed to distrust, obfuscation, and suspicion of both parties to the rule that governs their
relationship since they would be lacking a common mode of communication to share out the
content and the requirements of the rule and this would make both the actors to be suspicious
of the rule (Kraemer & Otarashvili, 2014, p.14). Hence sophisticated communication
phenomena after the Crimean crisis has adversely impacted the relationship between the EU
and Russia through developing some feeling of distrust and suspicion among the two security
actors which has been mainly caused by the absence of a proper common mode of
Normative elements identified by the constructivist theory
Also, the development of the constructivist strategy to evaluate the association of
Russia and the EU should take into consideration the identity and the normative elements, the
creation of conflict, the confluence of interests and the acknowledgments of the rules. The
notion of each is not fixed, however; they are subjected to the social construction because of
the flux in the area within which the relationship is being established (Kraemer & Otarashvili,
2014, p.14). Each of the conceptions is gullible to analysis through the constructivist lens.
Similarly, there has been a lack of understanding on the normative discrepancies, governance
strategy and opposing establishments of interest in explaining the ranging levels of Russia
and European Union relationships and tension. Among the hindrance to the enhanced
relationship amidst the EU and Russia after the end of the Crimean crisis was the differing
motivating and uncertain stakes in the future cooperation among the two security actors
(Schiffers, 2015, p.8). Similarly the reduction of the association among the actors have been
attributed to the emphasis of the EU on the value-based goals which consequently lowered
the national interest of Russia which in turn made Russia develop a negative attitude and
perception towards the EU thus derailing the strong relationship the two actors had during the
1990s and prior to the Crimean crisis (Makarychev, 2014, p.30). The constructivist strategy,
therefore, exposes the deep interrelations between opposing constructions, normative
mismatches and the weaker acknowledgment of the rules governing the associations to be the
cause of the weak relationship between Russia as well as the EU after the Crimean crisis.
Therefore through the constructivist theory, poor understanding of the common security
policy strategy on the nuclear weapon led to the escalation of the nuclear war after the
Crimean crisis had ended since both Russia and other EU states were competing for
sovereignty and supremacy in the control of the nuclear weapons. This adversely affected
their relationship since it led to Russia being perceived as the main threat to the EU and its
associates (Güney & Korkmaz, 2014, p.35).
Normative assumptions
The normative assumptions are rooted in the historical encounters, and they are
usually connected to the grasps of the various notions like democracy and security, justice,
solidarity and sovereignty. Therefore the core significant normative consideration to the EU-
Russia association entails the notions of identity, the weighting of the normative
considerations in connection to the material interest as well as the substance of the relevant
norm (Meister, 2014, p.7). Various constructivists have pointed out the centrality of the
identity matters pertaining to the association of Russia and the EU and it has been found that
the normative considerations play a crucial factor in determining their relationship. Because
of the normative considerations in the relationship among the two security actors, Russia has
been considered to be affected by the EU since the European Union’s insertion challenges
both the sovereignty and the legitimacy of the domestic practices of Russia and at the same
time it would make the leaders of Russia emphasis on interest as the most suitable language
of communicating with the EU to mask their personal normative choices thus making it
difficult to communicate effectively (Diesen, 2016, p. 100). Hence the constructivist theory
has highlighted the relationship between the EU and Russia through the normative
considerations which has contributed towards the imposition of the challenges on the
sovereignty and legitimacy of Russia by the EU (Gardner, 2017, p.152). Similarly, the
concept of the norm is significantly important in explaining Russia-EU relationship after the
end of the Crimean crisis. The Copenhagen criteria encompassing minority protection, human
rights, and constitutional protection are the most significant values for association with the
post-communist nations (Chaban et al., 2017, p.488). The values have been used to explain
and illustrate the level of relationship between Russia and the European Union after the
Crimean crisis (Güney & Korkmaz, 2014, p.35). The values are solidly embodied in the
conduct of the state that the EU has sought to expand abroad through its policy of
In addition, the extent among which there is real opposition to the norms, about their
meanings is another sector where there is the difference in the subjective understanding
between the EU and Russia. The constructivist has defined the national interest as a norm
which is always being informed by the identity and normative frames and that they always
have the value foundation through specifying the national goals which are more significant;
like economic growth, security, and environmental equality (Nitoiu, 2014, p.235). Therefore
the manner in which the matters are normatively framed by the officials and the media in
Russia and the European Union impacts the understanding of interest alongside how the
interest may be masked in the value language Likewise, the constructivists have
acknowledged that interests are not secure and complete, and they move from the greater
comprehension that the security players have on the universe (Diesen, 2016, p.105). The EU-
Russian association is distinctively established by the actors in different polities instead of
envisioning an objective definition of the interest (Nitoiu, 2014, p.237). Besides, the
understanding on the national interest is incorporated to the cognitive system which is deeply
rooted in the cultural and historical encounters of the two security actors hence the expression
of the national interest and the approaches to realize them are not simply the operations of the
reasonable estimation of cost and benefits. Hence the constructivist theory has elaborated the
security of Russian through highlighting the national interest in the Russia-EU relationship
after the Crimean crisis of 2014.
Managing association with Russia has represented a pivotal challenge to the universal
foreign policy alongside the security policy of the EU. Because of the conduct and behavior
of Russia the EU vowed never to recognize the illegitimate conquest of Crimean nor accept
the weakening of the Ukraine. The crisis in Ukraine which initially was an indirect outcome
of the pressure amidst the two security actors in their shared neighborhood left deep scars in
Ukraine which impulsively contributed towards the deterioration of the level of relationship
between the actors. Russia has challenged the European security order which has made it
difficult for the EU to reconstruct association with Russia in the geopolitical landscape. The
sophistication of the new strategic condition on the European continent has made it more
significant to understand the security perceptions of Russia, its global goals and motives. The
idea of the new strategic condition is widespread among the states of the European Union,
and it has impacted Russia through its current assertive universal behavior which required
Putin to restore the legitimacy of the regime. The associations between Russia and the
European Union have degraded after the Crimean crisis as compared to the relationship the
two security actors had before the crisis, and the changes in the association are attributed to
various factors like the change in the perception of Russia towards EU. Furthermore, the
imposition of the sanction by the EU on Russia after the Crimean crisis adversely impacted
the relationship between Russia and the EU since the sanctions lowered the established
standards of relationship which the two actors had been previously enjoying. Similarly, the
constructivist theory has significantly assisted in elaborating the level of association which
existed between Russian and the EU after the Crimean crisis.
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