How Russian Leaders Construct The Idea Of Security

Running head: RUSSIAN 1

Russian- EU relationship

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Introduction

The annexation of the Crimean peninsula by Russia in 2014 together with the

undeclared combat against Ukraine was the end of the post-cold period of peace in Europe.

The conduct of Russia destroyed crucial components of both the post –Cold war security

structure together with the post-WW II security structure in Europe. The actions of Russia

also contributed to the emergence of the new political division. Both Russia and the European

Union have been special actors since 1990s. Similarly, both Russia and the EU are

comparatively fresh as regional and universal security policy actors, and they are both in the

stages of formulating their exotic strategy identities though in distinct areas. Despite Russia

and the EU sharing the similarity of being new regional and universal foreign policy actors,

they have some differences in their approaches to foreign policy and political character.

Russia is habitually perceived as the global actor whose conduct effectively matches the

theoretical anticipations of the realist hypothesis while the EU is generally viewed as a post-

modernist actor perceived through the institutionalist center of global relations. Over the

years, the relationship between Russia and the EU has been more on economic development.

Nevertheless, their political relationships seemed to have deteriorated. With higher power

ambitions being the primary goal of each actor, this has made security the battleground for

regional superiority. Despite the differences in the security views of both Russia and the EU

the constructivism theory have placed a different perspective on the EU-Russia security

actors. Based on the constructivists’ views they argue that the creation of the inter-subjective

meanings amidst the two security actors may be both problematic and transformative. This

research paper, therefore, offers discussion on the application of constructivist theory to

expound the notion of security in Russia highlighting the Russia-EU relationship, especially

after the Crimean crisis.

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Russian-EU relationship after the Crimean crisis

Search of international foreign policy role

The constructivist strategy draws the mind to the reflexive association of Russia and

the EU along with the changing nature of the association in the environment of flux and

identity establishment. The notion of the security in Russia highlighting the relationship

between Russia and European Union can be elaborated through the search of foreign policy

role which would be based on different civilization ideas which include westernization and

Eurasianism. Therefore the ideas are important in the search of foreign policy role through

capacitating the formation of the foreign security policy of Russia (Gowland et al., 2014,

p.189). Through the search of an international foreign policy role has enabled Russian leaders

to move from Western-oriented foreign policy to Eurasian power and then to the declaration

of the excellent power role of Russia as a supreme nation within Europe (Romanova, 2015,

p.50). The statement by the Russian leaders has shown uncertainty in the international

identity of Russia since one side of the statement marked the historical and cultural

distinctiveness of Russia alongside Russia Eurasian character while the other side of the

statements by the leaders marked the affirmation of the European choice of Russia. Likewise,

the policy identity of the European Union is also is in its formation process just as in the case

of Russia (Joenniemi, 2016, p.120). However, the formation of the coordinated foreign policy

approach has been made to be difficult by the complication of the multi-level decision-

making system of the EU along with the overall flaws of the European identity. Therefore in

the ambiance of the Russian- EU association, none of the two actors have been able to

articulate clear policy on security successfully (Gowland et al., 2014, p. 189).

The expansion of the EU has complicated the difficulty of articulating policy on both

sides due to the evolution in the nature of the EU since 2014 which has considerably

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impacted on the decision-making circle of the EU. Therefore the search for a foreign policy

role on security has boosted the Russian-EU relationship through the attempt of creating a

common policy strategy that would boost their relationship. Following with the conclusion of

the PCA in 1997 capacitated the European Union to articulate a general policy strategy

towards Russia where Russia reciprocated the strategy in 2010 with the Medium-term

approach for the establishment of relationship amidst Russia and the EU (Fedorov, 2014,

p.21). Moreover, the Russian foreign policy concept defines the lasting perspective of Russia

in connection to the EU as being agreed on based on the strategic partnership pact

(Tsygankov & Francisco, 2014, p.158). Despite both Russia and the EU sharing similar

characteristics of forming and searching for a foreign policy role they have both been able to

jointly look for the standard policy strategy which would be effective for both of them as

security actors thus this has significantly boosted their relationship as new policy actors

(Hubel, 2017, p. 72). The interpretation by the realist conceptualizes Russia as being a unified

policy actor who responded to the security issues on the basis of reasonable estimation of the

national self-interest (Samokhvalov, 2018, p.795). Furthermore, Russian approaches on the

universal security matters normally envision zero-sum perceptions in terms of the

geopolitical interest within its own neighborhood. Therefore the constructivist has elaborated

the notion of security in Russia through the search for a foreign policy role which has

considerably impacted the Russia-EU relationship (DeBardeleben, 2012, p. 420).

Similarly, after the Crimean crisis of 2014, Russia-EU relationship continued to exist

since both agreed that their ties could not be broken after the crisis had ended. The global

strategy of the European Union recognized that both the EU and Russia are interdependent

(Tsygankov & Francisco, 2014, p.158). Moreover, the foreign policy of Russia stressed that

the European Union would remain to be an essential trade along with foreign policy partner

for Russia (Havlik, 2014, p.30). After the Crimean crisis, the vision of Russia to seek

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strategic collaboration with the EU became less prominent in the general strategy of Russia.

The decline in the vision of Russia to seek a strategic alliance with the EU happened

drastically before the imposition of sanctions on Russia by the European Union (Fedorov et

al., 2014, p. 21). Moscow increasingly perceived the EU, which over the years has

encountered several social and political problems, as being less relevant hence based on this

perceptions, Russia's partnership with the EU appeared to be less valuable regarding

sustaining Russian international standing than the strategic convergence with China along

with other main upcoming superpowers (Havlik, 2014, p.30). Despite the EU’s unfriendly

relationship with Russia, after the Crimean crisis, their relationship with the USA has

featured much significantly in the security and strategic agenda of Moscow for several years.

Rise of fresh political landscape

Likewise, after the crisis, there was the emergence of the new political landscape in

the key members of the EU and European Union became worried about the depth of the

changes that the political landscape would impose in its relationship with Russia together

with the ultimate capacity of EU to strengthen its policy as a strategic player. Moreover, after

the crisis there was a claim that the foreign policy and security policy of Russia was

motivated by the benign vision of the European Union. However, the claim was refuted after

the creation of the new policy concept of Russia which acknowledged that the methodical

problems in the Euro-Atlantic area that are exhibited in the geopolitical advancement pursued

by the NATO and EU together with the decline of the EU to start executing political

statements pertaining the establishment of a general European security is what contributed

towards strengthening of the Russian security policy (Gowland et al., 2014, p.189). The

containment policy acquired by the USA and its associates in the European Union members

against Russia imposed political pressure, economic pressure together with informational

pressure on Russia which considerably impacted Russia through undermining its regional and

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international stability in terms of security hence impacting the Russia security strategy by

causing instability near the border of Russia (Fedorov et al., 2016, p. 1502).

Development of negative perception against EU

Furthermore, after the crisis, Russia developed negative perception towards the EU

particularly after EU being depicted by Moscow to be imposing activities that challenges the

national interest of Russia. The negative perceptions which Russia had on the EU which

deteriorated their level of the relationship was caused by Russian perception on the EU as a

kind of strategic continuation of USA and NATO which are connected with the notion of the

military challenges alongside hard security problems (Jakniūnaitė, 2015, p.73). This

perception by Russia of the EU was compounded by the idea that EU nations that are also

NATO associates have reportedly opposed the critical position of Russia on the policy of

NATO. For example, the EU members have opposed the position of Russia on the anti-

missile defense system which in turn made Russia to develop negative perception towards the

EU and its associates. Moreover, Russia was seen to be as much concerned with the universal

competition based on the rivalry systems of values together with the societal development

models (Jakniūnaitė, 2015, p.73). However, Russia perceived the EU to be a challenge

towards its concern and interest on the societal development model thus leading to the

creation of negative attitude against the EU which resultantly contributed towards the decline

in their level of relationship after the Crimean crisis in 2014.

Moreover, Putin voiced a different view from its Euro-Atlantic counterparts on

several security matters ranging from the common neighborhood with the EU to the NATO

enlargement. The Ukrainian crisis initiated in 2013 illustrated the Russian own interpretation

of stability together with stability in Europe thus significantly resulted in the condemnation of

the Russian military escalation as a response to the crisis by the EU and USA. The use of the

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military moves has remained the recurrent Russian reaction to the context of crisis in Europe

(Raik, 2016, p.240). Therefore the diverse views of president Putin during and after the crisis

contributed to the establishment of the negative attitude and perception of Russia against the

EU and NATO which significantly impacted Russia-EU relationship through deteriorating

the level of the relationship which the EU and Russia enjoyed before the crisis. For example

due to the military moves which resulted because of the divergent view of Putin the Kremlin

positioned Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad in reaction to the organized anti-missile shield by

the EU and NATO and in response Russia launched a security preparedness exercise on the

border of Ukraine towards the end of the crisis (Proedrou, 2016, p.60). This has adversely

impacted on the association amidst the EU and Russia after the crisis had been called off

through enhancing the negative perception Russia had towards the EU and enhancing rivalry

amidst Russia and other EU associates like the USA (Raik, 2016, p.240).

Anti-missile defense system

Nevertheless, discomfort existed among the members about establishing the anti-

missile defense system since the system was perceived to be directed against Russia to depict

Russia as a threat to the EU. This made Russia develop the notion that the EU is against its

national interest hence it considerably lowered the relationship Russia had with the EU and

its associate states after the end of the Crimean crisis of 2014. Furthermore, the idea that

Russia should join NATO as well as participate in the missile defense system positively

impacted the relationship between Russia and the EU since it assisted in establishing an

alliance between them and their counterparts (Fedorov et al., 2016, p. 1505). Hence, it has

impulsively contributed to enhancing relations between Russia and the EU because they

could now work together to improve political stability and security through the use of the

standard system applicable by Russia and the other member states of the European Union

(Chaban et al., 2017, p.482). Therefore after the crisis idea of involvement of Russia in the

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missile defense system and joining of NATO positively impacted the relationship amidst

Russia and the EU through enhancing the partnership between them as security actors

because they could now work together with the aim of enhancing security through the missile

defense system thus boosting their level of relationship.

Application of conditionality of normative convergence

Moreover, after the crisis, the principled relationship the European Union aimed for

proved to be difficult to attain in association with Russia. Conversely, the application of

conditionality and the insistence of the normative convergence have progressively produced

an adverse impact on the EU because of the negative behavior of Russia which involved

illegal conquest of Crimean peninsula hence resultantly making the relationship amidst the

Union and Russia to reach its paradoxical stage (Cierco, 2016, p.70). Therefore, Russian

negative behavior of illegitimate conquest of Crimean peninsula caused inconsistency in the

strong level of relationship with the EU and this resultantly made their relationship to reach

the paradoxical stage. Also, the Ukrainian crisis exhibited the geopolitical contest and power

play, therefore, enabling high interest and foreign policy activism of Russia to surface across

other regions which threatened Russian interest, economic presence, and political influence

(Van Elsuwege, 2013, p.30). Notwithstanding the geopolitical competition and expansion on

high interest and foreign policy activism by Russia, there was also the steady growth of the

impact on the EU (Vinokurov, 2017, p.95). Moscow effectively ignored the growing effect of

the EU in the Baltic nations, Georgia and Maldova, and it also exhibited outstanding

disregard to the fate of its fellow citizens, and it did not technically demonstrate against the

completion of the association agreement amidst the EU, Moldova, and Georgia after the end

of the Crimean crisis. The association agreement undermined the position of Russia as well

as demonstrating the limitation of the neo-imperialist strategy in describing the complication

of the association of Russia with the EU across the shared neighborhood (Vinokurov, 2017,

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p.105). Besides, after the Crimean crisis the association amidst Russia and the EU changed

from being a cooperative association which both Russia and the EU enjoyed during the 1990s

to a competitive relationship. After the crisis the association that exists between Russia and

the EU was mainly based on competition over sovereignty unlike the 1990s where they

cooperatively interacted together with the primary aim of boosting security rather than

scrambling for superiority and sovereignty.

Establishment of anti-access and area-denial capabilities

Likewise, after the Crimean crisis, there was the build-up of Russian anti-access

policy and area-denial capabilities in Crimea together with the threats to deploy nuclear

weapons escalated tension amidst Russia along with the EU. The policy was created to deny

Russia access to the nuclear weapon and deployment of the weapons on the EU associates.

The increased pressure led to the renewed adversarial association as the return of the nuclear

supremacy to the European states after the Crimean crisis had been ended (Gardner, 2017,

p.150). The Russian lasting perceived hostility as well as the conventional capabilities of

NATO and their proximity to Russian heartland led to the rise of the military approach that

assigned a crucial obligation to limited nuclear strikes early in the combat as a way of

reducing NATO’s conventional dominance therefore assisting to end the conflict before

causing devastating loses to the heartland (Chaban et al., 2017, p.485). The use of the nuclear

weapons have been thought to depend on the decision made by the political leadership of

Russia since it is the leaders who decides when to deploy the nuclear weapon to the EU states

and its associates. Nonetheless, the prominence of the atomic weapons is indicative of the

nation’s perceived vulnerabilities alongside intensity of adversarial association with the EU.

Therefore after the end of the Crimean crisis, the relationship between Russia and European

countries adversely impacted since it led to the rise of the war over nuclear superiority since

both of them were competing to retain superiority over the nuclear weapons.

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Constructivist theory elaborating the notion of security in Russia

The constructivist theory has adequately elaborated on the notion of the Russian

security while highlighting the relationship between Russian and the EU and their concepts

have remained to be relevant since they draw attention to the subjective meanings. In the

scenario of identity construction exists in and amidst the European Union and Russia, the

creation of the inter-subjective meanings may be both challenging and transformative, and

the distinction in the governance system amidst the EU and Russia offer a weak foundation

for inter-subjectively shared rules regulating the relationship within the two security actors.

Moreover, the contested governance system can create a further problem for communication

and problem-solving (Alatalu, 2013, p.105). For example, the communication between

Russia and the EU encompasses a multifaceted phenomenon which has made it difficult to

solve various problems due to lack of a properly established mode of communication and this

has reduced the level of active association between Russia and the EU particularly because of

the communication barriers.

Additionally, communication between Russia and all the member states of EU has

remained to be a sophisticated phenomenon since the public statement cannot always be

taken at face value and they may not envision the position of the communication on both

sides of the shared inter-subjective understanding. Nonetheless, complicated communication

phenomena act as a hindrance rather than a facilitator of problem-solving and it has

contributed to distrust, obfuscation, and suspicion of both parties to the rule that governs their

relationship since they would be lacking a common mode of communication to share out the

content and the requirements of the rule and this would make both the actors to be suspicious

of the rule (Kraemer & Otarashvili, 2014, p.14). Hence sophisticated communication

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phenomena after the Crimean crisis has adversely impacted the relationship between the EU

and Russia through developing some feeling of distrust and suspicion among the two security

actors which has been mainly caused by the absence of a proper common mode of

communication.

Normative elements identified by the constructivist theory

Also, the development of the constructivist strategy to evaluate the association of

Russia and the EU should take into consideration the identity and the normative elements, the

creation of conflict, the confluence of interests and the acknowledgments of the rules. The

notion of each is not fixed, however; they are subjected to the social construction because of

the flux in the area within which the relationship is being established (Kraemer & Otarashvili,

2014, p.14). Each of the conceptions is gullible to analysis through the constructivist lens.

Similarly, there has been a lack of understanding on the normative discrepancies, governance

strategy and opposing establishments of interest in explaining the ranging levels of Russia

and European Union relationships and tension. Among the hindrance to the enhanced

relationship amidst the EU and Russia after the end of the Crimean crisis was the differing

motivating and uncertain stakes in the future cooperation among the two security actors

(Schiffers, 2015, p.8). Similarly the reduction of the association among the actors have been

attributed to the emphasis of the EU on the value-based goals which consequently lowered

the national interest of Russia which in turn made Russia develop a negative attitude and

perception towards the EU thus derailing the strong relationship the two actors had during the

1990s and prior to the Crimean crisis (Makarychev, 2014, p.30). The constructivist strategy,

therefore, exposes the deep interrelations between opposing constructions, normative

mismatches and the weaker acknowledgment of the rules governing the associations to be the

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cause of the weak relationship between Russia as well as the EU after the Crimean crisis.

Therefore through the constructivist theory, poor understanding of the common security

policy strategy on the nuclear weapon led to the escalation of the nuclear war after the

Crimean crisis had ended since both Russia and other EU states were competing for

sovereignty and supremacy in the control of the nuclear weapons. This adversely affected

their relationship since it led to Russia being perceived as the main threat to the EU and its

associates (Güney & Korkmaz, 2014, p.35).

Normative assumptions

The normative assumptions are rooted in the historical encounters, and they are

usually connected to the grasps of the various notions like democracy and security, justice,

solidarity and sovereignty. Therefore the core significant normative consideration to the EU-

Russia association entails the notions of identity, the weighting of the normative

considerations in connection to the material interest as well as the substance of the relevant

norm (Meister, 2014, p.7). Various constructivists have pointed out the centrality of the

identity matters pertaining to the association of Russia and the EU and it has been found that

the normative considerations play a crucial factor in determining their relationship. Because

of the normative considerations in the relationship among the two security actors, Russia has

been considered to be affected by the EU since the European Union’s insertion challenges

both the sovereignty and the legitimacy of the domestic practices of Russia and at the same

time it would make the leaders of Russia emphasis on interest as the most suitable language

of communicating with the EU to mask their personal normative choices thus making it

difficult to communicate effectively (Diesen, 2016, p. 100). Hence the constructivist theory

has highlighted the relationship between the EU and Russia through the normative

considerations which has contributed towards the imposition of the challenges on the

sovereignty and legitimacy of Russia by the EU (Gardner, 2017, p.152). Similarly, the

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concept of the norm is significantly important in explaining Russia-EU relationship after the

end of the Crimean crisis. The Copenhagen criteria encompassing minority protection, human

rights, and constitutional protection are the most significant values for association with the

post-communist nations (Chaban et al., 2017, p.488). The values have been used to explain

and illustrate the level of relationship between Russia and the European Union after the

Crimean crisis (Güney & Korkmaz, 2014, p.35). The values are solidly embodied in the

conduct of the state that the EU has sought to expand abroad through its policy of

conditionality.

In addition, the extent among which there is real opposition to the norms, about their

meanings is another sector where there is the difference in the subjective understanding

between the EU and Russia. The constructivist has defined the national interest as a norm

which is always being informed by the identity and normative frames and that they always

have the value foundation through specifying the national goals which are more significant;

like economic growth, security, and environmental equality (Nitoiu, 2014, p.235). Therefore

the manner in which the matters are normatively framed by the officials and the media in

Russia and the European Union impacts the understanding of interest alongside how the

interest may be masked in the value language Likewise, the constructivists have

acknowledged that interests are not secure and complete, and they move from the greater

comprehension that the security players have on the universe (Diesen, 2016, p.105). The EU-

Russian association is distinctively established by the actors in different polities instead of

envisioning an objective definition of the interest (Nitoiu, 2014, p.237). Besides, the

understanding on the national interest is incorporated to the cognitive system which is deeply

rooted in the cultural and historical encounters of the two security actors hence the expression

of the national interest and the approaches to realize them are not simply the operations of the

reasonable estimation of cost and benefits. Hence the constructivist theory has elaborated the

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security of Russian through highlighting the national interest in the Russia-EU relationship

after the Crimean crisis of 2014.

Conclusion

Managing association with Russia has represented a pivotal challenge to the universal

foreign policy alongside the security policy of the EU. Because of the conduct and behavior

of Russia the EU vowed never to recognize the illegitimate conquest of Crimean nor accept

the weakening of the Ukraine. The crisis in Ukraine which initially was an indirect outcome

of the pressure amidst the two security actors in their shared neighborhood left deep scars in

Ukraine which impulsively contributed towards the deterioration of the level of relationship

between the actors. Russia has challenged the European security order which has made it

difficult for the EU to reconstruct association with Russia in the geopolitical landscape. The

sophistication of the new strategic condition on the European continent has made it more

significant to understand the security perceptions of Russia, its global goals and motives. The

idea of the new strategic condition is widespread among the states of the European Union,

and it has impacted Russia through its current assertive universal behavior which required

Putin to restore the legitimacy of the regime. The associations between Russia and the

European Union have degraded after the Crimean crisis as compared to the relationship the

two security actors had before the crisis, and the changes in the association are attributed to

various factors like the change in the perception of Russia towards EU. Furthermore, the

imposition of the sanction by the EU on Russia after the Crimean crisis adversely impacted

the relationship between Russia and the EU since the sanctions lowered the established

standards of relationship which the two actors had been previously enjoying. Similarly, the

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constructivist theory has significantly assisted in elaborating the level of association which

existed between Russian and the EU after the Crimean crisis.

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How Russian leaders construct the idea of security

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