Political Science European Unions Response To The Arab Spring

European Union’s Response To The ‘Arab Spring’ 1

EUROPEAN UNION’S RESPONSE TO THE ‘ARAB SPRING’ NOT DRIVEN BY SELF

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European Union’s Response To The ‘Arab Spring’ 2

Abstract

Both violent and non-violent in nature, the political uprisings that were later referred to as the

‘Arab Spring’ began in Tunisia in 2010 and swept through the Middle East and North Africa

(MENA). Affected countries included Libya, Yemen, Egypt, Algeria, Bahrain, Syria, Morocco,

Kuwait, and Jordan, among others. In general, they were a response to cumulative oppressive

tendencies over the last few decades. In the period preceding the ‘Arab Spring,’ these states had

experienced high levels of repression, corruption, youth unemployment, nepotism, and wide

inequalities in social and economic status. Agitations in these states destabilized many

historically established governments with at least four of them being thrown out of power. The

countries involved being neighbors and trade partners to the European Union (EU) and its

member states; it was inevitable that EU responds appropriately. Initially, the EU approached

this issue with a distant and reserved tactic. This was entrenched in policies of non-interference

in other states affairs. Although separate EU states responded differently and expressed some

self-interest, as an umbrella body, the EU remained impartial and quite cautious in its retort to

the ‘Arab Spring’. Evidently, it was not driven by self-interest.

European Union’s Response To The ‘Arab Spring’ 3

EUROPEAN UNION’S RESPONSE TO THE ‘ARAB SPRING’

Introduction

Originating in Tunisia and commencing on 18 December 2010, an upsurge of both

violent and non-violent mass demonstrations, rebellions, and civil wars rocked the Arab world in

the Middle East and North Africa. As expressed by Saikal (2011, 530), these happenings were

spontaneous, widespread, and quite unpredictable. All of them were characterized by citizen

agitation against oppressive governments and tyrannical political tendencies. Markedly, the

countries involved had previously endured incessant repression and undemocratic policies,

which resulted in extensive socioeconomic inequality with wide unemployment gaps and

extensive poverty trends. It was then inevitable that political changes long resisted by these

governments get instituted (Maffucci-Hugel & Taubner, 2012, 246). It was the series of

demonstrations agitating for political transformation that came to be called the ‘Arab Spring’.

European Union’s Response to the ‘Arab Spring’

According to Ottaway (2010, 378), so volatile were these protests that they forced four

governments out of power, ended in serious civil uprisings in two countries, and caused major

demonstrations in six states with an equal number experiencing minor protests. Notably, related

episodes still occurred in other locations across the world. Of the ousted governments, Tunisia,

Libya, and Yemen had single counts. However, Egypt had its government thrown out of power,

reconstituted and ousted again. Other countries significantly involved included Algeria, Bahrain,

Syria, Morocco, Kuwait, and Jordan among many. Compelled to react, the European Union (EU)

initially approached the issue as a bystander. Despite the fact that EU has policies and codes of

relations with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), it did not adopt a common front in

addressing the ‘Arab Spring’. Instead, individual states responded to separate parts of MENA as

European Union’s Response To The ‘Arab Spring’ 4

they deemed fit by distinct perspectives (Dadush & Dunne, 2011, 131 -132). The outcome of the

whole situation was a circumstance whereby disparate cases of individual self-interests were

expressed. However, the umbrella response of the EU was democratic and policy oriented rather

than self-interest driven.

The EU’s relationship with the Middle East and North Africa is through the European

External Action Service. This is the foreign ministry and diplomatic core of the EU. These

relations are part of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). Before the Arab Spring, the EU

was against the US’s tough approach to the Middle East and had individual different free trade

agreements with each member state (Arribas, 2013, 88). The EU had been seen to support

political regimes in these Arab countries. Its initial response to the ‘Arab Spring’ was weak and

indecisive, and often viewed as a bystander approach. As such, the overall response of the EU to

the ‘Arab Spring’ was neutral and altruistic. However, individual member states took different

approaches. To an extent, these individual states acted in fulfillment of individual self-interest.

In an explorative analysis of the EU’s response to the ‘Arab Spring’, Schumacher (2011)

presented a double-ended scrutiny that presented the EU as spectator, as well as an actor

responding in dissimilar ways. Most importantly, Schumacher managed to display the fact that

EU adopted no common approach of self-interest. Yet, existent conflict between individual states

and EU’s overall common interest pointed to the states’ quest for some self-interest. While, most

governments took a wait-and-see perspective in the Tunisian case; probably for fear of falling

out with the government in case it repulsed the uprising, France went ahead and supported the

out-rightly undemocratic administration. Through the foreign minister of the time, the French

disciplined forces provided anti-riot expertise and crowd control strategies to the Tunisian

security (Schumacher, 2011, 114). Even in Egypt, the French prime minister rallied other

European Union’s Response To The ‘Arab Spring’ 5

southern European states to support Mubarak’s government. Nonetheless, Schumacher (2011,

115) explained that the prime minister and Egypt’s Mubarak were personal friends to the extent

that he had earlier on accepted gifts from Mubarak. As for the case of Libya, it is notable that EU

responded with a unified consensus of non-cooperation from its members. However, even after

this consensual declaration, Germany still refused to comply with the restriction of ‘no fly zones’

over Libya (Teti, 2012, 266). To an extent, the declaration itself was relatively inconsequential as

no other measures were adopted to compel democratization and upheaval of social equality in

Libya (Teti, 2012, 268). Perhaps, the constant diversity in opinions of member states made the

EU remain relatively silent even as oppression reached its peak in Syria. In similarity to Libya’s

case, countries like Germany, Estonia, and Cyprus expressed hesitations in adopting any

sanctionand conditional approach to Syria (Perthes, 2011, 75). On the overall, it is easily

identifiable that EU member states mostly took different approaches in responding to the ‘Arab

Spring’. This was not the common position of the EU.

On the other hand, Teti (2012, 271) expounded that although the EU’s initial approach

was weak and disorganized, an assessment of policy related reactions and ideological approaches

only indicated ideals of the EU rather than pursuit of self-interest. In the first policy

establishment, EU emerged with the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity (PfDSP).

This was a totally new democracy based approach to partnership and development. The

implication of its establishment was that EU funding of elections and other developmental issues

in MENA would be dependent on civil, political, and socio-economic improvements, and shifts

towards democracy. Notably, this policy could not be selectively applicable to some states.

Considering the fact that all members of the European Union subscribe to the body’s

established policies and ideals, it was then obligatory that all members implement approaches to

European Union’s Response To The ‘Arab Spring’ 6

related issues as stipulated by the EU. To this extent, members of the European Union expedited

numerous developmental projects across MENA states. In many occasions, such projects

targeted political stabilization, infrastructural recovery, commercial reestablishment, and civic

education in preparation for elections. As explained by Perthes (2011, 76), a better confirmation

of the impartiality and absence of self-interest in the EU’s approach could also be drawn from

responses across MENA. Many countries in North Africa adopted favorable and responsive

tendencies towards development and democracy. Despite the fact that the region had experienced

tendencies of relative autocracy, in attempts to stay aligned to European cooperation policies,

most states approached political ideologies with open minds and gave room for reasonable

majority rule. Thus, in the coordination relating to EU’s Partnership for Democracy and Shared

Prosperity, the major issue in target was sustainable development with democratic approaches in

which the EU expressed no self-interest.

The EU plays an important development role and advocates for democracy and

sustainable development in MENA. This is enhanced through the adoption of trade agreements

with states using the more for more approach. These development projects are very critical for

countries such as Tunisia and Egypt that were previously led by autocratic regimes (Peters, 2012,

124). It is fair to state that the EU as an organization had no self-interest in its response to the

political uprisings in MENA. According to the Commissioner for Home Affairs, EU, Europe

needed to develop a different agenda for its southern neighbors. This called for focus on open

partnerships and social human values (McCaffrey, 2012, 113).

In the view of Peters (2012, 127), The EU’s response as a body was positive despite the

contrary actions of some member states. The EU focuses on the development of Arab countries.

It revised its approach and now concentrates on the more for more policy in terms of

European Union’s Response To The ‘Arab Spring’ 7

development. This means that the further a country takes the initiative to implement reforms, the

more funds it will receive from the EU. Those countries that fail to implement reforms will

automatically receive less funding and have sanctions enforced against them. This EU strategy

with the Arab countries is also referred to as the three M’s (Money, Mobility and Markets). The

EU has free trade agreements with Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, and Egypt to invest in small

businesses. If the case were that of impartiality, then EU would not have participated in

numerous countries’ development projects. Instead, they would have adopted an approach

favoring their interests in some countries. Again, funding would not be based on progressive

states and development but individual interest.

The fact that EU as an overall organization did not respond in self-interest is easily

verifiable. In its response to the ‘Arab spring,’ the EU made it possible for Tunisians to have

free and fair elections and increased humanitarian assistance and aid to €400 million. In Egypt,

the EU provided €20 million to the civil society to fund the elections and ensure its process was

democratic. The EU also supported trade, economic growth, job creation through agricultural

Small and Medium Enterprises (SME’s), and reforms in the energy and water sectors. In

Morocco, the EU increased aid after a successful positive result of the referendum on the new

constitution and creation of parliament. Currently, it supports development in five key areas in

Morocco; economic modernization, institutional support, good governance, human rights, and

environmental protection. In Jordan, EU supports reforms and the development of SME’s to

reduce poverty and increase employment opportunities for the youth. It also supports research,

innovation, education, democracy, and governance. The situation in Libya and Syria is different

given the magnitude and brutality of the demonstrations. In Libya, the EU suspended all

technical cooperation and negotiations. In Syria, it condemned the anti-regime protests and

European Union’s Response To The ‘Arab Spring’ 8

introduced economic sanctions. It also placed an embargo on firearms and introduced asset

freezes and travel bans against the country (McCaffrey, 2012, 65). Generally, the situational

presentation of the case of EU indicated no identifiable self-interest.

Richey (2013, 412) also noted that the upsurge of the ‘Arab Spring’ increased migrations

from MENA to various European states. In an affirmation of the EU’s position in relation to

expression of interest while responding to the ‘Arab Spring’, Richey (2013, 413) explained that

the ‘Arab Spring’ led to shifts in Migration Policy Development across EU states. Again, he

showed that the enactment of immigration policies was more of state government oriented than

the EU’s. It is therefore provable that many controversial policies emerged from the states. To

mention but a few, the EU supported a free and fair election in Tunisia, provided €20 million, for

Egyptian election and humanitarian aid, and funded business stimuli in Jordan, Morocco, Syria,

and Libya (Springborg, 2011, 429). As a union, the EU responded without pursuing self-interest

at any point.

Conclusion

The rise of the ‘Arab Spring’ brought about several challenges to the affected

governments, as well as Europe as a whole. Such included economic effects, interruptions of

trade, issues related to political stability, and increased migrations from MENA to Europe. In its

approach of responding to these issues, the EU initially took a passive non-interference

approach. However, as events continued to unfold, the EU’s response became more active but

still did not develop tough measures to solve any situation. As an organization, the EU had no ill

motive in its response to the ‘Arab Spring.’ It is the individual member states that were driven by

their individual agenda which sometimes conflicted with those of the EU. The actions of the

individual member states made it difficult for EU to become assertive and thus, it was unable to

European Union’s Response To The ‘Arab Spring’ 9

act appropriately. The individual member states needed to be unified under EU to focus on

development, human values, and sustainable development with MENA. In approach, the EU

remained reserved while focusing on ideologies of democracy and ideals of development. At no

point was its response driven by pursuit for self-interest. Nonetheless, individual member states

acted divergently with each pursuing options that were appropriate to its distinct concerns.

European Union’s Response To The ‘Arab Spring’ 10

Reference List

Arribas, G. 2013. The European Union's Relations with the Southern-Mediterranean in the

Aftermath of the Arab Spring. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Institute.

Dadush, U., & Dunne, M. 2011. American and European Responses to the Arab Spring: What's

the Big Idea? Washington Quarterly, 34, 4, pp. 131-145.

Maffucci-Hugel, C., &Taubner, Z. 2012.The Council of Europe's response to the Arab

Spring.Security & Human Rights, 23, 3, pp. 245-248.

McCaffrey, P. 2012. The Arab Spring. Ipswich, Mass.: H.W. Wilson.

Ottaway, M. 2010. The Rise and Fall of Political Reform in the Arab World. Current History,

109, 731, pp. 376-382.

Perthes, V. 2011.Europe and the Arab Spring.Survival (00396338), 53, 6, pp. 73-84.

Peters, J. 2012. The European Union and the Arab Spring: promoting democracy and human

rights in the Middle East. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books.

Richey, M. 2013. The North African Revolutions: A Chance to Rethink European

Externalization of the Handling of Non- EU Migrant Inflows. Foreign Policy Analysis, 9,

4, pp. 409-431.

Saikal, A. 2011. Authoritarianism, Revolution and Democracy: Egypt and beyond. Australian

Journal of International Affairs, 65 (5), pp. 530-544.

Schumacher, T. 2011. The EU and the Arab Spring: Between Spectatorship and Actorness.

Insight Turkey, 13, 3, pp. 107-119.

Springborg, R. 2011. The Political Economy of the Arab Spring.Mediterranean Politics, 16 (3),

pp. 427-433.

European Union’s Response To The ‘Arab Spring’ 11

Teti, A. 2012. The EU's First Response to the ‘Arab Spring’: A Critical Discourse Analysis of

the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity. Mediterranean Politics, 17, 3, pp.

266-284.

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