Prohibitive, Permissive, And Prescriptive Norms In The Open Society

Prohibitive, Permissive, and Prescriptive Norms

in the Open Society

Thursday, December 14

, xxxx

1. Introduction

Normativity is a phenomenon in human societies that allows for social norms as an

essential layer of invisible and many times unstated rules that govern how we interact with

others, outlining what is permissible, prohibited, or prescribed. Social norms allow us to make

decisions within a group of other normative agents, and let us see past the individual moral

convictions that each hold, allowing for widespread and complex cooperative behavior, even

when individual agents are programmed with vastly differing moral code that would otherwise

define what actions are permissible. Without social norms to dictate behavior, cooperation

ultimately becomes a futile endeavor; in the case of early humans, who employed agricultural

techniques for their sustenance, social norms were a normative construct that were arguably

crucial for survival. The first Neolithic Revolution (widely agreed to have begun around

10,000 BC) was a critical transition from the hunter-gatherer lifestyle to one of agricultural work,

wildlife domestication, and settlement, which led to the first significant increase in world

population through densely populated settlements. This increase in population was mainly the

result of a surplus in food: a mother could now raise more than one child concurrently. This

increase in available food also led to the emergence of the first “social elite”, demarcated by an

amassed supply of excess food, and the time and ability to make decisions for the rest of the

tribe. Agricultural societies, underpinned by complex patterns of widespread cooperation,

eventually grew, developed formal hierarchal governments, industrialized, spread, and mixed

with others. The open, liberty-granting, democratic societies we see today (and generally

associate with Western society) tend to be regarded as permissive and tolerant.

In this project, I elaborate on the distinction of permissive, prohibitive, and prescriptive

norms, and their role in how once primarily agricultural societies evolved into the arguably

socially dynamic, innovative, and complex open societies that exist today. Specifically, I intend

to explore how permissive norms that grant liberties are not completely conducive to open

societies, but rather, how prescriptive and prohibitive norms are arguably more important for the

emergence of an open society.

2. Open Society

The term Open Society as used in this discussion originates from the work of French

philosopher Henri Bergson in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, but was most notably

expanded on by Austrian philosopher Karl Popper in The Open Society and its Enemies.

Bergson originally saw the notion of an open society as one which was innovative and

dynamic, but inclined towards moral universalism, the later part of which I believe isn’t

necessarily valid. Deirdre Nanson McCloskey, who’s Bourgeois Equality offers an explanation

for the emergence of Western society as widely prosperous and dynamic, would support

Bergson’s claim of moral universalism as a foundation for an open society. She writes,

“From about 500 BCE to about 1790 CE, the ethical universe was described in Europe as

composed of the seven principal virtues, resulting by recombination in hundreds of minor

and particular virtues” (McCloskey, 188).

McCloskey attributes a significant part of the rise of Western Europe’s prosperity and openness to

shared virtue: in essence, people held similar moral convictions, which allowed for the continued

cooperation necessary to transition from tribal and closed societies (definitions forthcoming), to

the open societies that we observe today. While McCloskey does mention Milton Friedman to

invoke the importance of social rules in an open society, Gerald Gaus argues that she “tends to

underappreciate the place of moral and social rules in the grounding of an open society” (Gaus 2),

and is skeptical of the significance of the role that shared virtues played in cultivating an open

society. He presents two arguments against the role of moral universalism in an open society. The

first is from Cristina Bicchieri, who presents a UNICEF study on violence toward children, which

reported that “it was stunning to realize that caregivers who report a negative judgment on

punishment still punish in large numbers” (Bicchieri 42). In essence, attitudes and internalized

moral convictions are weak predictors of how people actually behave. The second argument

presented by Gaus concerns the “heterogeneity of the open society”, which argues that the nature

of an open society is that individuals encounter strangers who hold very different moral

convictions, and “who’s character traits are largely unknown” (Gaus 3) – yet, we are able to

cooperate with some degree of success, regardless of these wide differences in moral convictions.

An open society as defined in this paper is one which is dynamic and innovative, offering certain

liberties, but not necessarily subscribed to the ideal of moral universalism.

Karl Popper takes a historicist’s approach to describing society in general: tribal/organic

societies originally emerged during the agricultural revolution, and established laws based on

mysticism and sacred truths, or had decisions and laws set in place by the aforementioned “social

elite”, who had the time, resources, and eventual prestige to make decisions for the whole. In

Popper’s words, there is no distinction between “natural laws…such as the laws describing the

movements of the sun” and “normative laws, or norms” (Popper 63) in a tribal society. The next

step in the historical progression is then a closed society, or one which can be modern but which

does not afford liberties and is still heavily governed through a strict governmental hierarchy, akin

to authoritarianism. In a closed society, individual freedoms are subordinate to the state, and social

mobility is a restricted process. The last progression is an open society, who’s political process is

more transparent, and affords liberties to its inhabitants. Popper argues in his work that the

emergence of an open society is in part characterized by its inhabitants distinguishing between

natural and man-made law, whereas a tribal society (closed-society), does not distinguish between

these two, meaning that traditions are likely to remain unchallenged and the status quo remains,

since subverting authority would mean to subvert sacred natural truths. He thus maintains that the

first open society was 5

century Athens, as Athenians were the first to scrutinize their beliefs,

traditions, values, and institutions, which resulted in a more open discourse and the emergence of

more liberties. An open society in this sense is “more free” than a closed society, as rules are open

to scrutiny, since they are not rooted in sacred beliefs, but in intentional human-derived legal

ascriptions.

A specification in this paper regarding open societies (and one which I believe is

uncontroversial), is that Western society in theory (but not always implementation) is an open

society. A traditional democratic republic is in definition an open society. Critics could argue that

in modern societies that are “open”, technology has allowed for agents with political or economic

influence and incentives, to employ subtle Orwellian methods of deception on the electorate,

meaning that truth, which is conducive to individual and collective liberty, is no longer part of

political discourse. I would contend (and believe Popper would agree) that the specification of an

open society as described in The Open Society and its Enemies rises above these criticisms, since

an open society is one which allows for inquiry, which leads to truth, but also allows for dishonesty,

meaning that the prevalence of truth is not guaranteed. As different agents with different moral

convictions act to instill ideas and build institutions in an open society, deception remains as both

a consequence and as a more readily available tool for social manipulation (which arguably is

necessary for cooperation). One could argue that agents in tribal societies were less deceptive, as

they were told (and likely believed) the rules and laws that were directly sent down to them by

religious and non-religious authority. Tribal societies are also historically smaller than larger open

societies, so deception is not as necessary of a tool for manipulation (and by extension,

cooperation), unless you are the religious figure head and wish to deceive your tribe for the purpose

of control and stability (assuming you don’t firmly believe in the sacred truths you yourself are

preaching). The most prevalent ethical systems that govern western societies tend to ascribe

negative value to deception and lies, yet based on an open society’s definition of 1. a society which

allows for truth but does not guarantee it, and 2. a society which does not depend on McCloskey

and Bergson’s lean towards universal moralism, I believe that the definition of an open society

supersedes the criticism of allowing for deception, as a lack of openness.

After addressing these criticisms of moral universalism as a means to an open society, the

question remains: to what extent did normative rules have an impact on the emergence of an open

society, and to what extent does the distinction between a permissive, prohibitive, and prescriptive

norm matter? Gaus emphasizes the importance of social rules in the emergence of an open society,

as social rules are necessary for cooperation. Based on Bicchieri and Alex Chavez’ work, we have

evidence that suggests that human behavior is very much impacted by the normative expectations

of others, and that a

“person often prefers to follow a social rule r because he has a first-order belief that that

enough others in his social network follow r and he has a second-order belief according to

which he believes that enough others in the network believe that he ought to follow r”

(Gaus 5).

This does not mean that the person must believe r is

“morally good, efficient or [a] fair rule”, but only that “most people have to (i) believe that

most others will act on it and (ii) believe that most others believe that it ought to be

followed” (Gaus 5).

In other words, normativity does not require that all moral agents uphold the same moral

convictions for cooperation, or for that matter, any of them. What matters most is the expectation

of others, and the fear of punishment for deviating from the norm, that allows for cooperation and

leads to the complex interactions required in an open society where moral agents each hold

potentially differing moral convictions.

3. Prohibitive, Permissive and Prescriptive Norms

Critical to the discussion is the specification and distinction between prohibitive, permissive, and

prescriptive norms.

In very general and idealized terms (as there are varying schools of thought surrounding

the conceptions of norms), a prohibitive norm is one which clearly outlines certain actions which

are not permissible. For example, “you cannot swim unattended if you are under 18”, would be

an example of a prohibitive statement (in this case explicitly stated as a rule), as it clearly outlines

what action cannot be allowed. A permissive norm, on the contrary, is one which outlines

permissible propositions, but does not explicitly mention prohibited ones. For example, “you are

allowed to swim by yourself in the wading pool” is a permissive (and in this case explicitly stated)

rule, that mentions a single proposition (swimming by yourself in the wading pool) and allows it,

but makes no explicit mention to other actions which might otherwise be prohibited or permitted.

Third is the prescriptive norm, phrased in the imperative, which commands an action as necessary,

and condemns inaction as a violation. For example, “watch your younger brother at the pool” is a

prescriptive rule, as not watching him would be a violation; it not only permits an action, but

mandates it.

However, the ontological standing and logical properties of norms are still very much

controversial, and vary depending on their definition as prescribed by philosophers, lawyers, and

deontic logicians. The first controversy surrounds the logic of norms. Deontic logicians accept

the concept of a logical relation between norms, while expressivists generally reject that norms

hold logical relations between each other; rather, normative propositions can be logical, but norms

themselves cannot. Somewhat related to this issue is the idea that norms can hold truth. There is

little consensus over whether one can ascribe truth values to norms, even if one accepts that there

exist logical relations between norms. The two competing schools surrounding the conception of

norms are currently characterized as the hyletic and the expressive conception of norms.

Under the hyletic conception, “norms are proposition-like entities, that is, meanings of

certain expressions, called normative sentences…A norm is said to be the meaning of a normative

sentence in…the same way that a proposition is regarded as the meaning (sense) of a descriptive

sentence. A normative sentence...has prescriptive meaning: that something ought, ought not, or

may be the case (or be done)” (Alchourron 384). The hyletic view states that norms are conceived

as entities which are independent of language. Under the expressive conception, norms “are the

result of the prescriptive use of language. A sentence expressing the same proposition can be used

on different occasions to do different things: it can be asserted, questioned, commanded,

conjectured, and so on”. Most notably, “it is only on the pragmatic level of the use of language

where the difference between statements, questions, commands, and the like arises; there is no

such difference on a semantic level” (Alchourron 385). Under the expressive conception, norms

are purely commands (prescriptive): essentially, norms are only used for commanding. This

alludes a norm-expressivist to conclude that there are no such things as permissive norms. When

conducting the mental exercise of thinking of prohibitive and permissive norms, one might find

that it is much harder to outline examples of permissive norms in the wild. This line of reason

would seemingly support the expressivists’ theory of prescriptive norms (and that permissive

norms don’t exist), however, a deontic logician (and most lawyers) would still support that

permission and obligation are two entirely different concepts, which I tend to agree with. To

further explore permissive norms, the distinction between weak (negative) and strong (positive)

permission can be made. A weak permission goes toward stating that an action is allowable only

when it is not prohibited. Outside of the vernacular of deontic logic, weak permissions tend to be

designated as the permissions that a prohibitive norm would allow. A strong permission, on the

other hand, is more in-line with the traditional concept of a permissive norms, and says that an

action is permitted if a norm explicitly states that the action is permitted (and does not directly rely

on the absence of prohibition). It follows that (assuming the concept that norms hold logical

relations), “if some b logically follows from a, which is strongly permitted…b is strongly

permitted as well” (Governatori 2). I hold that permission is a distinct concept from prescription,

since varying levels of permission are possible, permission does not necessarily lead to obligation,

and permission differs greatly, depending on whether it is viewed in contrast to prohibition (weak

permission) or not (strong permission).

Prescriptive norms are interesting, because their logical inverse is apparently the same as

a prohibitive norm, but not necessarily so in reverse. A prescriptive norm outlining “Keep your

mouth closed while you eat” is an example of a command, which if not followed, is viewed as a

social violation in some countries. Its logical inverse, a proscriptive norm, would be “never speak

with food in your mouth”, and at first appearance appears to be a prohibitive norm. However, they

are subtly different, as the phrasing “never“ implies a negative imperative, making this norm

proposition truly proscriptive, while the truly prohibitive phrasing of this norm should look more

like “you are not allowed to eat with food in your mouth”. While we may psychologically

internalize the same norm, regardless of whether we are witness to either the proscriptive or the

prohibitive phrasing, the logical phrasing of the norm proposition is different. The logical inverse

of a prescriptive norm proposition looks very much like a prohibitive norm, but the logical inverse

of a prohibitive norm should more rightly so be a strong permissive norm proposition. Regardless,

it’s interesting that prescriptive norms are logically different to prohibitive norms, yet may be

internalized in the same way as prohibitive norms, based on the linguistic similarity of a clearly

prohibitive negation of action and a negative imperative. Based on this assumption, I lean towards

including prescriptive norms and prohibitive norms under the same normative umbrella with

regards to their role in birthing an open society, and permissive norms separate.

4. Norms in the Open Society – Natural Liberty

As outlined in section 2, an open society is generally viewed as permissive, tolerant, and a

liberty-granting society. My invocation of norms in an open society is heavily tied to the notion

of liberty. One camp supports natural liberty as the defaulting moral stance, and as specifically

defined by John Mikhail in the context of a closed system that is teachable, Natural Liberty states

that “Whatever is not prohibited (and this includes the non-performance of specific acts) is

permitted” (Nichols 15). This rule is contrasted by another closure rule, Mikhail’s Residual

Prohibition Principle, which states that “Whatever is not permitted is prohibited” (Nichols 16).

While the notion of defaulting and committing to liberty as a moral default is a controversial

philosophical stance, there is empirical evidence that seems to suggest that humans lean towards

the notion of natural liberty as a default. This certainly stands to support the notion that an open

society is one which is committed to liberty, but less controversially, that the social capacity to

default to natural liberty is advantageous to individuals, as it allows us to navigate the dynamic

and novel issues that arise in an open society.

The two different closure principles above can apply to various games. The game of chess

is used as an example of a system closed under residual prohibition, as there are various permissive

rules outlined about the movements of pieces, but there is nothing in the rules stopping you from

replacing the rook with an omnipotent wizard that kills the king immediately, yet convention deters

the rational player from doing so. Opposite to this is the game of holding a balloon up, where the

object of the game is that you must keep the balloon up, and the only rule is that you are not

allowed to hold it. This game’s rules are closed under natural liberty, as any other imaginable

action is valid, other than the prohibition of holding the balloon. It assumes that the teacher

detailing the rule set is trying to help the student learn, and is providing beneficial and rational

information. Gerlad Gaus and Shawn Nichols conducted a recent study in which participants who

are learning about a closure rule set with limited information adopt pedagogical sampling to come

to consensus on whether or not to permit an action.

In the experiment, some participants are given two prohibitive rules:

1. “Squeaky mice are not allowed to be in the Red Barn”

2. “Squeaky mice are not allowed to be in the Yellow Barn”

Some participants are given two permissive rules:

1. “Squeaky mice are allowed to be in the Red Barn”

2. “Squeaky mice are allowed to be in the Yellow Barn”

A third group is given mixed rules, one permissive and one prohibitive:

1. “Squeaky mice are not allowed to be in the Red Barn”

2. “Squeaky mice are allowed to be in the Yellow Barn”

All participants are then asked to indicate whether or not mice are allowed to be in the Green Barn.

The results indicate that when faced with prohibitive statements, participants tend to allow mice

into the green barn (5.73 out of a 7 point scale), while permissive statement participants are less

likely to do so (3.16 out of 7 points). This indicates that participants can quickly learn a either of

the rule sets, depending on their exposure to either prohibitive or permissive statements. The

mixed experiment, when adjusted to a 6 point scale that forced participants to pick a side, and

clarified by adding that there are only 2 rules in the set (no missing or hidden rules), showed that

participants tended to lean towards allowing the action and close the system (5.5 out of 6 points)

rather than not allowing it (residual prohibition, permissive wording, 1.8 out of 6 points). While

these results don’t completely justify natural liberty as a sacred natural principle of morality in an

open society, the results indicate that “people can infer closure principles in rationally appropriate

ways” (Nichols 24). More importantly, natural liberty (prohibitive phrasing) gave participants the

ability to adjust and quickly change when faced with an ambiguous rule set, while a permissive

rule set was more akin to maintaining the status quo and prohibiting actions.

These results suggest that when faced with morally ambiguous situations, we tend to prefer

allowing actions rather than prohibiting them, given a mixed prohibitive-permissive norm. These

results can be explained in different ways. The evolutionary approach could for example explain

how allowing for natural liberties is advantageous when faced with a complex, changing and

dynamic society, and thus became a fitness-increasing characteristic that was adopted over time.

A further argument for experiment bias could be made, stating that the demographic representation

of those who took part in this experiment was heavily representative of people who live in western

democracy, and that participants from more “closed” societies would give be more restrictive in

dishing out their allowance of actions under the proposed rule set. This leads to the concept that

one’s environmental norm background directly influences to what extent a norm is internalized, or

even in what way the norm is internalized (as prohibitive vs. permissive).

5. Norm Tightness-Looseness and Implications

Germane to this last argument is Michele Gelfand’s work on norm looseness-tightness.

Conducted by multiple researchers across 33 nations, they categorized countries and their

respective population as being “tight” or “loose” with regards to their norms. Tight nations are

those with “strong norms and a low tolerance of deviant behavior”, while loose nations are those

that have “weak social norms and a higher tolerance of deviant behavior” (Gelfand 1100). Tight

countries tend to have higher population density, higher dependence on crops, less public

communication channels, stronger police presence, are overall less permissive. It’s interesting to

note that a majority of the tightest societies (the tightest four mentioned are Pakistan, India,

Malaysia, and South Korea), have historically relied heavily on agriculture for sustenance.

Tightness remained from the tribal society days of society for the purpose of cooperation, in order

to allow for the continuation of essential agricultural systems. Other countries with notable norm

tightness are ones which have faced or face existential threats, including plague, natural disasters,

or invasion, which equally require increased levels of cooperation as a means for survival. Tribal

societies who still operate under the hunter gatherer lifestyle, like the Inuit of Alaska, exhibit looser

norms, as cooperation is not as relevant to survival. Relevant to my last point concerning Gaus

and Nichols’ study on how people from different nations might perceive prohibitive and

permissive norms is Gelfand’s claim that not only are distal ecological and historical factors

relevant to the norm tightness of any given society, but recurrent, daily episodes in local

communities are equally important to how deeply norms are internalized in a given society.

Inhabitants of tighter nations spend more time policing each other than those from looser nations,

and thus seem to prohibit more acts: the onus of explanation to ensure conformity lies in the person

committing a certain action, and not in the observer. In general, countries that are tighter tend to

show characteristics that are more representative of autocratic rule (i.e. the opposite of liberty).

“Tight nations are more likely to have autocratic rule that suppresses dissent…, less open media

overall…, more laws and regulations and political pressures and controls for media…, less access

to and use of new communication technologies…, [and] fewer political rights and civil liberties.

Criminal justice institutions in tight nations are better able to maintain social control” (Gelfand

1103). These findings seem to suggest that nations with higher norm tightness are less open

societies (without necessarily implying a two-way causal relation, you could also say that closed

societies tend towards having tighter norms).

While this paper makes no ascription of moral righteousness to either end of the loose-

tightness spectrum, the least that can be said is that open societies and tightness do not tend to

correlate. A characteristic of tightness is the prohibitive nature of the society as a whole. However,

this does not necessarily invoke the prevalence of prohibitive norms. In prohibiting a few things

and thus giving weak permission for an infinite number of many more things, prohibitive norms

actually allow more than they prohibit. In contrast, permissive norms work the other way,

assuming we operate under the context of hyletic norm conception: they prohibit much more than

they allow. Based on this notion alone, one could consider that the prevalence of permissive norms

might be more likely in closed, norm-tight societies that permit few things and strongly oppose

many others, while prohibitive norms are more prevalent in open societies, which allow for more

freedoms while prohibiting less actions. The argument for prohibitive (and prescriptive) norms in

loose and open societies is easier to make than the argument for permissive norms in closed, tight

societies. One of the foundational definitions of an open society is the opportunity for innovation,

and prohibitive norms are certainly more conducive to this end. Technological innovation is

generally a socially disruptive occurrence, both in effect and in implementation: the act of creating

something new or even exploring something unexplored breaks with the status quo. When Ignaz

Semmelweis began suggesting that doctors and nurses wash their hands in a chlorine lime solution

before operating on patients, many doctors were offended at the notion that they were in any way

to be considered dirty and the cause of the high rate of infections and deaths. There are countless

other stories of inventions and innovations that were initially ridiculed, for the very reason that

change is disruptive. A prohibitive framework will rarely if ever prohibit actions that lead to

innovation and discovery, as those actions that lead to innovation in the first place are generally

unknown. Opposite to this notion though, a permissive set of rules tends to discourage innovation,

as unstated actions are more likely to be categorized as socially dubious. The end result is that

prohibitive norms, somewhat counter-intuitively, are more likely to spur the advancements that a

society needs to increase material wealth, increase standard of life, or allow for larger populations

over time.

Permissive norms are less identifiable in an open society (or a closed one, for that matter),

except maybe in the case of natural rights, similar to the ones granted under a constitution.

Constitutional language in general, and more specifically in reference to the American

constitution, is written in permissive language that guarantees freedoms and allows for natural

liberties, seldom offering explicit prohibitions. This seems to go against the notion of prohibitive

rules as conducive to an open society. I offer two counter-points to this notion. The first is that

the authors of this document were concerned with overturning a set of prohibitions that they found

oppressive, open society aside. While prohibitions generally grant the exploratory boundaries

necessary for circumventing the established order, it can be argued that in this case, the

establishment of permissive rules (natural rights, although I imagine there is much in the field of

philosophy of law that would take issue with my prescription of a natural right as a permission)

was a necessary means to overturn a prohibition around which there was no wiggle-room around.

More notably so, the rights described under a constitution are different than a social norm, to some

degree, so the argument between permission and prohibition may not be exactly the same. While

the laws in a culture tend to reflect the norms (killing someone in most places is seen as a social

deviance from the norm, and likely possibly a moral issue, so homicide laws reflect this cultural

belief), they are usually written in thought-out and concrete language, whereas social norms

proscriptions are sometimes nebulous, and depending on various cultural variables can be

internalized in different ways (as is the case between prohibitive and proscriptive norms, for

example). Essentially, the definition of a foundational permissive document that underpins an

open society’s legal system (and guarantees rights) does not necessarily fall under the normative

umbrella, but only reflects the possibility of openness and liberty that an open society is capable

of.

I make the case that prohibitive norms are conducive to the formation of an open society,

but it’s important to look at transitory periods when open societies emerged and other factors that

contributed to this phenomenon. When transitioning from a closed society to an open one, many

nations went through a period of heavy industrialization, which was arguably beneficial to the

material well-being of a society and thus its existential well-being. Industrialization is a complex

process that is heavily tied to innovation; prohibitive norms are of course conducive to this.

However, industrialization also seemingly requires cooperation, which does not discriminate

between prohibitive and permissive norms, but mainly relies on norm tightness. With that said,

norm tightness is less necessary when industrial efforts are coming out of the private markets,

versus a mandated industrialization designated down by the governmental body. While economies

like that of China went through heavy periods of industrialization, they are arguably still a very

closed nation in many regards, in comparison to western societies that industrialized through a

more organic method of private businesses slowly expanding within its own community (and with

some limited help from the government). These organic-industrializers (for lack of a better

oxymoron) arguably required less sustained cooperation, and instead were able to succeed based

on the market dynamics of providing a service to meet a demand within their own, smaller

community, until eventually they were able to expand to meet national demands. The difference

in why one society emerged as more open than the other is lengthy discussion of social, historical,

and macro-economic factors, but I contend that the prohibitive norm framework that allowed for

innovation, given that the innovation happened organically, was much more conducive than a

permissive framework. As industrialized nations secured their place in the world and amounted

some semblance of existential security, the necessity for norm tightness slowly declined, giving

room for looser normative patterns. Of course, there are outliers to this pattern, as tightness-

looseness is part of a complex system of social externalities and behaviors, and mapping it directly

with prohibitive and permissive normative distinctions would be a mistake.

Regardless, the concept of how we internalize norms is still very interesting and still open

to discussion. When concerned with norms, we are particularly focused on the aspect of the

normative construct that offers punishment for deviating from the social rule. This may allude to

the prevalence of prohibitive and proscriptive norms, as they explicitly state the condition which

leads to social punishment: from a linguistic perspective, the clause which specifies an action that

leads us to punishment is psychologically more likely to be absorbed. In the field of developmental

child linguistics and psychology, caregivers are generally encouraged to resort to responsive

language instead of restrictive language for the purpose of developing self-control in children, and

for children to “be more compliant, cooperative, and considerate” (Stone 17). Restrictive language

(“no hitting!” instead of “hitting hurts. I can’t allow you to hurt anyone”) is seen as conducive to

aggressive behavior and deviance in general. Restrictive language can loosely be associated with

proscriptive commands, as it specifically conveys an action that shouldn’t be done if the child

wishes to avoid punishment, and by extension, prohibitive structures, as it is more easily able to

be internalized by the child (but with apparently negative character development consequences).

Responsive language, on the other hand, requires more attention on behalf of the caregiver, as it

instills positive values (“higher motivation, less anxiety”), but at the cost of receptiveness on behalf

of the child. It is much easier for a child to understand restrictive language than responsive

language, which is why child caregivers are educated to user responsive language, since it is not a

natural default for communicating (when we communicate a prohibition to a child, we are trying

to get them to not do something: a prohibitive, restrictive response is both a clearer form of spoken

communication for immediate results, and a more digestible linguistic construct on the receiving

end due to the emphasis on punishment, negative developmental consequences aside). This

suggests the notion that we internalize the prohibitive aspects of norms with more ease than the

less immediate permissions we must deal with in order to function in a complex social setting. By

extension, we could define the prohibitions that a permissive norm offers as “weak prohibitions”,

since they are not explicitly stated, but psychologically implied.

This argument would benefit from further social experiments regarding how norm types

(permissive, prohibitive, prescriptive) are internalized by inhabitants of cultures with varying

normative tightness-looseness. Ultimately, better understanding the internalization of norms is

key to understanding human behavior under the web of normative rules, and how our actions as

individuals and as groups of varying sizes lead and have led to the emergence of dynamic and

ever-changing societies. While the legal philosophers and deontic logicians may debate the logical

and truth properties of a norm, understanding how different cultures and language speaking groups

process the linguistic constructions of norms in a pragmatic setting can shed light on the more

philosophical implications of normative rules. A deeper understanding of the normative layer that

invisibly governs our daily interactions can be useful to understanding the social, political,

economic, and philosophic dynamic of our societies, and can even give us certain control over how

we design our institutions and laws, to the extent that we can positively influence populaces and

communities through knowledge of social behavior.

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Bergson, Henri, et al - The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. American Printing House for

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