The Effect Of Cocaine In Colombia

THE EFFECT OF COCAINE IN COLOMBIA

(Student’s Name)

(Course Title)

(Name of Institution)

(Date)

Introduction

This report focuses on how illegal trade in cocaine influenced politics in Colombia. The

emphasis is on how illicit trade in cocaine weakened effective functioning of the state by

infiltrating and corrupting the state. Likewise, it deals with how illicit cocaine trade offered non-

state actors with legitimacy and coercive force. This essay focuses to show that the illegal

cocaine trade minimized state power while increasing the authority of non-state actors. This

report begins by presenting some theories that highlight the relationship that exist between the

illegal drug economy and the existence of armed insurgents. Following this will be a discussion

on how cocaine in Colombia contributed to state disintegration. Finally, the process of state

revitalization is presented by describing how the Colombian government was able to reestablish

itself and reduced the power of insurgents and paramilitaries.

Theoretical Perspectives

There are major four theoretical perspectives that can be used in explaining the

association between the illegal drug economy and armed insurgents. The internal capabilities

approach contends that armed insurgents with an objective of acquiring finances via crime are

highly likely to establish internal criminal capabilities rather than create alliances with other

criminal entities.

In essence, a political organization engages in transforming its structures to

undertake a political or financial function instead of cooperating with other groups with

competency in such activities.

This means that an insurgent group can establish internal criminal

capacities because the learning curve associated with entry into the illicit market is not sharp. In

examining armed groups within specific regions involved in producing illegal drugs, it was

Dishman, Chris. ``Terrorism, crime and transformation’’. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism24(2001), 48

ibid

found that insurgents participate in the illegal drug trade with such participation transforming

their impetus. In particular, the insurgents shift to direct participation from taxation of producers

of illegal drugs. The outcome of the participation in the illegal drug trade affects the motivations

of the insurgents characterized by an acquisition of a financial impetus that displaces or

complicates their ideology.

The conflict approach focuses on the violence between armed insurgents or organized

criminals by arguing that conflict occurs when armed insurgents attempt to penetrate into illicit

markets with already existing criminals. Conflict also happens once the political objectives of the

armed insurgents pose threats to the weak state where organized criminals are operating in. The

elucidation of the violence between criminal and armed groups is related to the search for

monopoly. Consequently, organized criminals end up undermining and destroying any insurgent

that strives to operate in the same illicit market. This theory is supported with evidence

indicating the conflict between the Cali and Medellin drug cartels in Colombia.

The conspiracy theoretical perspective posits that criminal entities collaborate with each

other to advance their general objectives. This view has been supported with assertion of the

existence of an alliance among paramilitaries, insurgents, and the illicit drug industry in

Colombia.

It is suggested that while such an alliance was due to convenience purposes, it

nonetheless established a political agenda to exert leverage on the Colombian government.

Cornell, Svante. ``Narcotics and armed conflict: interaction and implications’’. Studies in Conflict &

Terrorism30(2007), 214

Williams, Phil. Cooperation among criminal organizations. In Mats Berdal and Monica Serrano, Eds.,

transnational organized crime & international security(CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002),68

Manwaring, Max. Non-state actors in Colombia: threat and responses. Strategic Studies Institute, 2002. Accessed

at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdffiles/PUB16.pdf,9

ibid

Finally, the business network perspective perceives that criminal entities establish

different linkages for pursuing mutually beneficial financial gains. It is contended that these

associations reflect those relationships formed between legal businesses.

Conversely, the

cooperation between the criminal entities is edgy, and it is challenging to develop or maintain

such an association because of the violence and anarchy that characterizes the groups’ operating

environment.

Criminal groups might decide to work together as a way of spreading the risks of

participation in criminal actions or securing distribution networks. This has been shown in the

case where cocaine drug traffickers were required to pay for utilization of airstrips under the

control of the Nicaraguan contras.

These theoretical perspectives are useful in explaining the actions of the paramilitaries,

cartels, and armed insurgents during their involvement in the illegal cocaine industry and the

resulting impact on the state disintegration in Colombia,

Cocaine in Colombia and State Disintegration

In Colombia, cocaine production for export and the emergence of organized illegal drug

trade occurred in the 1970s. The profits generated from the illegal trade in cocaine facilitated the

expansion and self-financing of the business and stimulated the development of stable links and

routes with suppliers of coca paste from Peru and Bolivia as well as distribution networks and

transportation systems for shipment purposes.

Owing to the financial potential offered by

cocaine, farmers shifted to cultivating coca. It is suggested that by the 1980s, the illegal drug

Williams, 69

Williams,71

Williams, 67

Thoumi, Francisco.`` Illegal drugs in Colombia: from illegal economic boom to social crisis’’. Annals of the

American Academy of Political and Social Science, 582(2002),105

trade represented between 10% and 25% of the total exports in Colombia.

Technological

developments for cultivating and refining coca enabled Colombia to become the leading cocaine

producer in the globe.

The cocaine trade in Colombia was under the control of the Medellin and Cali cartels.

These cartels acquired wealth from cocaine trafficking that led them to start interfering with the

state. For instance, in 1984, the Medellin cartel initiated a campaign to prevent the Colombian

government from engaging in further extradition of drug traffickers to the USA.

The cartel was

able to successfully assassinate police officers, judges, and government officials to exert pressure

on the government to stop extraditing drug traffickers.

The coercive power of the Medellin

cartel was further demonstrated in 1987 when the supreme court of Colombia was forced to rule

that the extradition treaty between the USA and Colombia was not constitutional to limit the

cartel’s attack on the government.

Conversely, this ruling failed to curtail the actions of the

cartels as more violence was witnessed evidenced by the assassination of police officers,

journalists and judges from 1989 to 1993.

The Medellin cartel also usurped state coercive

authority and power by forming a private paramilitary group that comprised of criminals from

Medellin city.

These paramilitaries were involved in conducting violent campaigns for the cartel

Holmes, Jennifer, Sheila Guiterrez and Kevin Curtin.`` Drug violence and development in Colombia: a

department level analysis ’’.Latin American Politics and Society48.3(2006),165

Thoumi, Francisco. Political economy & illegal drugs in Colombia(Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers,1995),57

Clawson, Patrick, and Lee III Rensselaer. The Andean cocaine industry( Palgrave MacMillan,1998),35-50

Clawson and Lee III,78

Thoumi, Francisco. Illegal drugs, economy and society in the Andes(Maryland: John Hopkins University Press,

2003),131

Sanin, Guitterez, and Mauricio Baron. Restating the state: paramilitary territorial control and political order in

Colombia(1978-2004)( Crisis Research Center, 2005),1-8

and protecting land belonging to drug traffickers.

Importantly, state military supported these

paramilitaries by using them as a counter-insurgency army against Marxist insurgency.

This

demonstrates that the state’s structures had weakened and the drug trade had extensively

infiltrated Colombia. In an examination of regions with strong guerilla presence in Santander and

La Rochelait, it was discovered that the senior military official offered intelligence and tactical

support to paramilitary activities.

This collaboration between the paramilitaries and the state

military highlights the overbearing impact of the illegal drug trade over the government where

the state was fragile to the point of working with entities resisting government authority by

engaging in illegal drug activities. The Medellin cartel did not only usurp the coercive power of

the Colombia state, it also pursued a political campaign under Pablo Escobar. Particularly,

Escobar created a political movement and used it to be elected as an alternative deputy in the

Congress.

Furthermore, the cartel funded various civic programs such as donating new houses

and supporting infrastructure projects such as sports facilities and water wells. The cartel also

bought media entities and utilized televisions and newspapers for promoting its agenda.

Ultimately, the Medellin cartel was able to establish an autonomous drug republic at the

Magdalena valley.

However, the Cali cartel utilized money from cocaine trafficking in financing intelligence

and protection networks in the main government institutions such as courts and the military.

Report indicated that the police force in Cali city was on the payroll of the Cali cartel and served

Hunt, Stacey. Rethinking state, civil society and citizen participation: the case of the Colombian paramilitaries.

Behemoth: a journal of civilization, 1(2009),67

Ibid., 85

Ibid., 69

Clawson and Lee III,56

Thoumi 2003, 115

Harding, Colin. Narcobusiness (London: Victor Gollancz, 1998),98

as a private militia for the cartel.

As such in Cali, there was an existence of a state-supported

protection framework characterized by drug traffickers obtaining legislative advantages and

enforcement entitlements by making payments to police officers and judges. For example, the

Cali cartel paid 2000 pesos to a police general on a monthly basis compared to the wage earned

from the government, which was only 700 pesos.

The degree of the legal influence and

economic infiltration was exposed in police and judicial investigation in 1994 indicated that the

airport police, most of the police, retired army personnel, some city councilors and the local

prosecutor were receiving payments from the Cali cartel.

Overall, the direct effect of the illegal cocaine economy was crippling of the state where

the judiciary was entirely incompetent. In addition, the Colombian state lacked domination over

the use of violence as it had to yield this function to paramilitaries belonging to drug cartels in

disputed territories. Thus, operating the illegal cocaine economy enabled the cartels to acquire

military, political, and economic influence that had the impact of weakening existing state

institutions. Furthermore, this influence allowed cartels to assume state functions by providing

social services and security in areas where their presence was dominant.

Due to the considerable threat of the Cali and Medellin cartels, law enforcement officials

in Colombia implemented urgent actions following pressure from the USA. Between 1989and

1996, nearly all the lynchpins from the two cartels were either killed or arrested.

Conversely,

this did not lead to the end of the illicit cocaine economy but resulted in its restructuring

characterized by downsizing and streamlining of the operations. Specifically, there was an

Clawson and Lee III,78

Ibid., 76

Synder, Richard and Martinez Angelica. ``Drugs, violence and state-sponsored protection rackets in Mexico and

Colombia’’. Colombia Internacional 70(2009),73-5

Peceny, Mark and Durnan Michael. ``The FARC’s best friend: US antidrug policies and the deepening of

Colombia’s civil war in the 1990s’’. Latin American Politics and Society48.2(2006), 102-3

emergence of small drug trafficking groups that setup operations in small towns. This made it

possible for them to operate in secrecy by bribing local officials to acquire protection for the

illegal activities in secrecy.

The downscaling of cocaine trafficking organizations led to the

increasing participation of guerilla entities in the activity and the progression of paramilitaries

into independent traffickers.

Because of anti-narcotics campaigns in Bolivia and Peru in the

1990s, the majority of coca cultivation moved into Colombia. To avoid government enforcement

and eradication, most of coca cultivation became concentrated in the regions under the control of

the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia).

The FARC insurgents became

involved in the cocaine trade by collecting payments from drug traffickers in the region.

FARC

extended its involvement in the cocaine trade through imposition of taxes on airfields,

construction and maintenance of processing laboratories, and protection of exportation

routes.

Nearly 20% of combatants in FARC were involved in protecting regions under coca

cultivation in the early 1990s.

Estimates indicate that FARC accrued almost $100 million each

year from participation in the illegal cocaine trade.

As a result, FARC had the ability of

extending its territorial control and widened its support in the rural areas by offering coca

Diaz, Ana Maria and Sanchez Fabio. A geography of illicit crops (coca leaf) and armed conflict in

Colombia(Crisis States Research Center, 2004),7

Restrepo, Andres and Guizado Alvaro. From smugglers to drug lords to traquetos: changes in the Colombian

illicit drug organizations.2001. Accessed at http://kellogg.nd.edu/faculty/research/pdfs/LopeCama.pdf,24

Bagley, Bruce. Drug trafficking, political violence and US policy in Colombia in the 1990s.2001. Accessed at

http://clasarchive.berkeley.edu/Events/conferences/Colombia/workingpapers/working_paper_bagley.html,8

Chernick, Matt. Economic resources and internal armed conflicts: lessons from the Colombia case(Washington

D.C: Woodrow Wilson center press, 2005),19

Norman, Susan. The FARC and the war on drugs in Colombia. Paper prepared for the 7

annual conference of the

international society for the study of drug policy, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá Colombia, 15-17 May, 2013,12



Ortiz, Roman.``Insurgent strategies in the post-cold war: the case of the revolutionary armed forces of Colombia’’.

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism25(2002),137

Richani, Nazih. Systems of violence: the political economy of war and peace in Colombia state(University of New

York Press, 2002),75

farmers with protection from the government’s anti-drug policies.

The finances obtained from

participating in the drug trade enabled FARC to increase its military capacity thereby allowing

the guerillas to deepen its war with the Colombian government. This supports Dishman’s

argument that armed insurgents can accrue financial benefits from illegal activities to develop

their internal capabilities. Prior to its participation in the drug trade, the FARC had minimal

military capability for engaging in large-scale attacks against the government.

Conversely, with

increasing involvement in the illegal drug economy, FARC’s capabilities increased substantially

such that in 2002, it launched over 2000 against government forces.

The FARC army had

defeated the Colombian army in 1997.

It is estimated that by 1998, FARC had an army of12,

000 combatants.

In 2002, FARC launched various bomb attacks in Bogota, which

demonstrated the insurgent group from the rural areas had managed to execute assaults on

Colombia’s capital city.

FARC achieved legitimacy in regions under its control by carrying out

parallel government functions. Specifically, FARC provided economic support and sponsorship

to community action boards called Juntas de Accion Communal in territories under its control.

These boards were able to construct ports and schools with financial support from FARC rather

than the Colombian government. Members of these boards supported the political activities of

Suarez, Alfredo. `` Parasites and predators: guerrillas and the insurrection economy of Colombia’’.Journal of

International Affairs 53.2(2000),585

Richani,49

Moser, Caroline. Moser, Caroline. Building sustainable peace and social capital. In Solimano, Andreas,Ed.,

Colombia: essays on conflict, peace and development( pp.9-70)(Washington D.C.: the International Bank For

Reconstruction, 2000),14

Rabas, Angel and Chalk Peter. Colombia labyrinth: the synergy of drugs and insurgency and its implications for

regional stability(Santa Monica: Rand,2001),42

Felbab-Brown, Vanda. Shooting up: counterinsurgency and the war on drugs(Washington D.C.: Brookings

Institute Press, 2010),89

Guaqueta, Alexandra. The Colombian conflict: political and economic dimensions in the political economy of

armed conflict: beyond greed and grievance. In Ballentine Karen and Jake Sherman, Eds., the political economy of

armed conflict: beyond greed and grievance (pp.73-107) (Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2003),85

Norman, 26

FARC and acknowledged the leadership of the guerrilla group.

Consequently, FARC obtained

support from the locals for its political activities. Therefore, FARC had a monopoly over

coercive force especially in isolated areas. In addition, FARC entered into mutually beneficial

collaborations with criminal organizations in Latin America and Colombia by exchanging

cocaine for arms or cash or cash for protection.

Such an activity illustrates the business

networks theoretical approach described earlier on. Overall, FARC was supplanting the

government by repudiating its conventional monopoly over the use of violence and defying the

government’s authority over regions of the country that were still being controlled by the state.

Similarly, paramilitaries capitalized on the drug economy to accrue profits from this

activity.

The paramilitary forces came together and formed the Autodefensas Unidas de

Colombia in 1996 with reports showing that this group controlled 40% of the narcotics trade in

the country.

The profits generated from the drug trade facilitated the expansion of the group’s

military capacity to almost 2000 individuals in 2000.

Because of its improved financial

position, this group initiated a plan for expanding its reach in Colombia. This was achieved by

using combat units with training that was possible from the income accrued from the drug trade.

As a result, Colombia was facing a guerrilla uprising that was being supported by the illegal

cocaine trade. The Colombian government decided to complement its war against the uprising by

using paramilitaries and ignored their drug operations. The paramilitaries did not deal with

Ibid., 27

Saab, Bilal and Taylor Alexandra. ``Criminality and armed groups: a comparative study of FARC and

paramilitary groups in Colombia’’. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32.6(2009), 467

Tate, Winifred. ``Paramilitaries in Colombia’’. Brown Journal of World Affairs3.1(2001), Accessed at

http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/brownjwa8&div=22&id=&page=,165

International Crisis Group. War and drugs in Colombia. Latin America report no.11. 2005. Accessed at

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/011-war-and-drugs-in-

colombia.aspx,16

Sanin, Guitterez. ``Criminal rebels? A discussion of civil war and criminality from the Colombian experience’’.

Politics and Society32.2(2003), 268

similar enforcement measures from the government in relation to their illegal drug operations,

which partly accounts for the ability of these forces to operate with violence and impunity.

Paramilitaries accounted for over 80% of violence in Colombia in the 1990s.

Paramilitary

groups were a very serious risk to the Colombian state by using violence to secure territorial

control, sabotaging peace initiatives with the insurgents, and breaking down institutional reform

efforts. The military in Colombia enlisted paramilitaries into their operations and provided with

necessary assistance and logistics. Although the Colombian government had declared that the

paramilitaries were illegal, they still maintained relationships with them. It is reported that the

paramilitaries were an illegal element of the police and armed forces as they carried out activities

that could not be done by both the police and armed forces.

This collaboration was

unsuccessful in dealing with the insurgents because the FARC continued to spread.

The government’s inability to curtail the growth of guerillas is related to an increase in

FARC’s financial power. In this context, FARC had established an influential motivation for

abstaining from resolving the conflict with the government because the profits generated from

the cocaine trade had strengthened the guerillas unlike the coercive weaknesses of the

government. This was seen when the FARC failed to participate in negotiations with the

government in 1998 with lack of serious proposals being observed almost 4 years later.

The

negotiations between the FARC and the Colombian government stopped in 2002 and were

accompanied by an increase in conflict and violence because the paramilitaries perceived that the

government was not adopting a hard position with the insurgents, which led to assaults on the

Olney, Patricia.``Global order local chaos: explaining paramilitary violence in Chiapas, Mexico and Colombia’’.

Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement12.2(2006),5

Sanin and Baron, 10-11

Olney, 22

Shifter, Michael and Jawahar Vinay. ``State building in Colombia: getting priorities straight’’. Journal of

International Affairs 58.1(2004),145

FARC and violence on in the country.

Conversely, it is important to highlight that FARC’s

unwillingness to cease conflict cannot be attributed to the guerillas need to continue capitalizing

on coca out of greed. The commanders and the guerillas in the insurgency did not accrue

personal gains from the cocaine trade as these finances were utilized for funding the operations

of FARC. Therefore, the negotiations between the government and FARC failed because the

insurgency was in occupation of nearly 60% of the country

, which means that it had military

capability and did not need to participate in the process of demobilization. Over time, the

involvement of FARC in the cocaine trade created a legitimacy challenge for the group. The

group was fighting both the paramilitaries and state that increased pressure for increasing

finances for sustaining its war operations.

Consequently, FARC undertook a different approach

in the cocaine trade by displacing small drug groups within its territory and exercising control

over the cultivation of coca.

Initially, FARC was involved in the cocaine trade by convincing

drug traffickers to offer higher prices to coca farmers. Conversely, the group began to impose

prices and forced coca farmers to sell their coca leaves only to FARC. In the regions under its

control, FARC established itself as the main purchaser of coca products and outlined the terms

for cultivating, harvesting, and processing coca, which was against the desires of the

locals.

FARC’s regulation of the cocaine extended to control over the production capacity and

prices of the commodity. Illegal coca cultivators were required to pay the group 10% in tax,

while merchants paid 8%, and cocaine traffickers paid a fixed fee for FARC’s protection of the

Ibid., 147

Bejarano, Ana Maria, and Pizarro Eduardo. Colombia: the partial collapse of the state and the emergence of

aspiring state makers. In Spears, Ian and Paul Kinston, Eds., states within states: incipient political entities in the

post-cold war era (pp.99-119)(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004),105

Hough, Phillip. ``Guerilla insurgency as organized crime: explaining the so-called political involution of the

revolutionary armed forces of Colombia’’. Politics and Society39(2011),390

Richani, 99

International Crisis Group 2005, 9

airports and laboratories.

FARC monopolized the purchase of coca paste that caused resentment

as the group undercut farmers and enforced stricter requirements on the cultivation and

processing of coca leaves (ICG 2009, 10).

The changes in the illegal cocaine trade in the 1990s ensured that its expansion through

an increase in players by incorporating different groups in Colombia. As such, the lucrative

cocaine trade offered benefits for different groups that were challenging state authority. It is

reported that the relationships between conflict and the illegal cocaine trade created over

$3billion for the anarchistic groups.

Basically, this indicates a disparity between capabilities

and resources of the anarchistic groups and those possessed by the Colombian government.

Thus, the legitimacy of the Colombian government reduced because it lacked resources and

capabilities unlike the anarchistic groups who had the capacity from the illegal drug trade. It is

noted that this led to the disintegration of the judicial system and impunity where over 90% of

murders and 95% of crimes were not addressed by the government.

The outcome was the

intertwining of the cocaine trade and internal conflict and the Colombian government was almost

collapsing because the illegal drug economy was providing anarchistic groups with territorial

control and coercive capabilities. Indeed, three-fourths of the country's territory was contested or

under the control of paramilitaries and guerillas

that hampered the functioning of the country’s

institutions.

Revitalization of the Colombian state

Norman, 12

International Crisis Group. Ending Colombia’s FARC Conflict: dealing with the right card. Latin America report

no.36.2009. Accessed at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/030-ending-

colombias-farc-conflict-dealing-the-right-card.aspx ,10

Shifter and Jawahar, 145

Thoumi 2002,109

Sweig, Julia. ``What kind of war for Colombia’’. Foreign affairs (2002), 127

As explained above, the illegal cocaine economy played a critical role in destabilizing the

Colombian state by providing anarchistic groups with capability and resources necessary for

challenging government authority and legitimacy. To prevent looming collapse of the state, the

Colombian government had to find a way of reestablishing its legitimacy. This was characterized

by transformation in policy by shifting focus from a counter-narcotics approach that had targeted

the illegal cocaine economy as a way of reclaiming the government’s power and putting an end

to the conflict in Colombia. This approach had been adopted to obtain military assistance and

financial aid from the USA that was conditional on Colombia identifying with the United States’

security measures that emphasized controlling the supply of illegal drugs in

Colombia.

Conversely, the Colombian government realized that anti-narcotics approaches were

not effective because they failed to reduce the supply of cocaine. Therefore, the democratic

security policy was adopted to secure the presence of the state and consolidate lacking state

institutions in Colombia.

The guiding foundation of this policy was intensifying the law and

securing the government’s control in the whole country. Particularly, this was attained by

increasing police presence and military budget expenditures in Colombia. Colombia received aid

from the USA in implementing its policy. It is reported that between 2000 and 2008, the

Colombian government received $4.9 billion from the USA to strengthen its military and police

force.

This was accompanied with forces from the USA offering technical intelligence to the

armed forces in Colombia, which improved the capacity of the Colombian military. In the past,

the FARC defeated the Colombian military because it was not adequately equipped and lacked

Rochlin, Jim. ``Plan Colombia and the revolution in military affairs: the demise of the FARC’’. Review of

International Studies 37(2011),720

International Crisis Group. Colombia: president Santos’ conflict resolution opportunity. Latin American report

no.34. 2010. Accessed at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/034-

colombia-president-santoss-conflict-resolution-opportunity.aspx ,2-4

Rochlin, 724-8

appropriate training. However, the implementation of the new policy by the Columbian

government ensured that the country had well-trained soldiers with its capacity increased.

The

effectiveness of Colombia’s military capability was demonstrated by the decline of FARC in

territories in the country. Statistics show that by 2009, FARC had presence only in 206

municipalities compared to 514 municipalities in 2002.

Moreover, the presence of the

insurgents declined by over 50% by 2010.

Further statistics indicated that combatants in FARC

had reduced from 18,000 in 2001 to 9000 in 2008.

In addition, the Colombian government

regained control over critical infrastructure by forcing insurgents out of highly populated

regions.

Consequently, FARC continues to lose its capability in launching assaults to acquire

new territories and operates in tropical jungles.

Similarly, members of the paramilitaries have

been demobilized under the Peace and Justice Law established in 2005.

The demobilization of

paramilitaries and weakening of FARC insurgents has led to some level of stability in the

Colombia.

Conclusion

This report has shown that the illegal cocaine economy played a critical function in

eroding the state by providing non-state actors with finances that enabled them to augment their

control over territories in the country. Furthermore, the funds from the cocaine trade allowed

non-state actors to acquire political legitimacy and coercive force, which gave them capabilities

for contesting state authority to a degree where the government institutions became overwhelmed

Vuters, Jason and Smith Michael. ``A question of escalation-from counter-narcotics to counter-terrorism:

analyzing US strategy in Colombia’’. Small Wars and Insurgencies17.2(2006),174

International Crisis Group 2009, 7

Ibid., 8

Saab and Taylor Alexandra, 459

International Crisis Group 2010, 4

International Crisis Group 2009,5

Saab and Taylor, 469-70

by the illegal drug economy. Although the illegal cocaine trade is yet to be completely

eradicated, the policies implemented by the Colombian government have been effective in

marginalizing cartels, guerillas and paramilitaries. Although cocaine is still present in Colombia,

the state has undergone gradual revitalization, which is an indication that the size of the illegal

drug industry is not of value, but rather the organizational context within which it operates in.

The successful outcomes of curtailing insurgents and paramilitaries benefitting from the illegal

drug industry has shown that structural and institutional reforms are necessary for addressing the

negative consequences of the industry on state stability. Overall, Colombia demonstrates that

illegal drugs such as cocaine contribute to the disintegration of the state by internally eroding

state functions and funding the usurpation of the state’s legitimacy, coercive power, and

territorial control by non-state actors.

Bibliography

Bagley, Bruce. Drug trafficking, political violence and US policy in Colombia in the 1990s.2001.

Accessed at

http://clasarchive.berkeley.edu/Events/conferences/Colombia/workingpapers/working_pa

per_bagley.html

Bejarano, Ana Maria, and Pizarro Eduardo. Colombia: the partial collapse of the state and the

emergence of aspiring state makers. In Spears, Ian and Paul Kinston, Eds., states within

states: incipient political entities in the post-cold war era (pp.99-119). New York:

Palgrave MacMillan, 2004

Chernick, Matt. Economic resources and internal armed conflicts: lessons from the Colombia

case. Washington D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005.

Clawson, Patrick, and Lee III Rensselaer .The Andean cocaine industry. Palgrave MacMillan,

1998

Cornell, Svante. ``Narcotic and armed conflict: interaction and implications’’. Studies in Conflict

and Terrorism 30(2007):207-27

Diaz, Ana Maria and Sanchez Fabio. A geography of illicit crops (coca leaf) and armed conflict

in Colombia. Crisis States Research Center, 2004. Accessed at

http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28213/1/wp47.pdf

Dishman, Chris. ``Terrorism, crime and transformation’’. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism

24(2001):43-58

Felbab-Brown, Vanda. Shooting up: counterinsurgency and the war on drugs. Washington D.C.:

Brookings Institute Press, 2010

Guaqueta, Alexandra. The Colombian conflict: political and economic dimensions in the

political economy of armed conflict: beyond greed and grievance. In Ballentine Karen

and Jake Sherman, Eds., the political economy of armed conflict: beyond greed and

grievance (pp.73-107). Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2003

Harding, Colin. Narcobusiness. London: Victor Gollancz, 1998

Holmes, Jennifer, Sheila Guiterrez and Kevin Curtin.`` drug violence and development in

Colombia: a department level analysis ‘’.Latin American Politics and

Society48.3(2006):157-84

Hough, Phillip. Guerilla insurgency as organized crime: explaining the so-called political

involution of the revolutionary armed forces of Colombia’’. Politics and Society39.3

(2011): 379-414

Hunt, Stacey. Rethinking state, civil society and citizen participation: the case of the Colombian

paramilitaries. Behemoth: A Journal of Civilization 1(2009):64-78

International Crisis Group. Colombia: president Santos’ conflict resolution opportunity. Latin

American report no.34. 2010. Accessed at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-

america-caribbean/andes/colombia/034-colombia-president-santoss-conflict-resolution-

opportunity.aspx

International Crisis Group. Ending Colombia’s FARC Conflict: dealing with the right card. Latin

America report no.36.2009. Accessed at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-

america-caribbean/andes/colombia/030-ending-colombias-farc-conflict-dealing-the-right-

card.aspx

International Crisis Group. War and drugs in Colombia. Latin America report no.11. 2005.

Accessed at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-

caribbean/andes/colombia/011-war-and-drugs-in-colombia.aspx

Manwaring, Max. Non state actors in Colombia: threat and responses. Strategic Studies

Institute, 2002. Accessed at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdffiles/PUB16.pdf

Moser, Caroline. Building sustainable peace and social capital. In Solimano, Andreas(Ed.),

Colombia: essays on conflict, peace and development( pp.9-70).Washington D.C.: The

International Bank for Reconstruction, 2000

Norman, Susan. The FARC and the war on drugs in Colombia. Paper prepared for the 7

annual

conference of the international society for the study of drug policy, Universidad de los

Andes, Bogota Colombia, 15-17 May, 2013.

Olney, Patricia. Global order local chaos: explaining paramilitary violence in Chiapas, Mexico

and Colombia.’’Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement 12.2(2006):1-36

Ortiz, Roman. ``Insurgent strategies in the post-cold war: the case of the revolutionary armed

forces of Colombia’’. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 25(2002):127-35.

Peceny, Mark and Durnan Michael. The FARC’s best friend: US antidrug policies and the

deepening of Colombia’s civil war in the 1990s. Latin American Politics and Society

48.2(2006):95-116

Rabas, Angel and Chalk Peter. Colombia labyrinth: the synergy of drugs and insurgency and its

implications for regional stability. SantaMonica: Rand, 2001

Restrepo, Andres and Guizado Alvaro. From smugglers to drug lords to traquetos: changes in

the Colombian illicit drug organizations.2001. Accessed at

http://kellogg.nd.edu/faculty/research/pdfs/LopeCama.pdf

Richani, Nazih. Systems of violence: the political economy of war and peace in Colombia state.

University of New York Press, 2002

Rochlin, Jim. Plan Colombia and the revolution in military affairs: the demise of the FARC.

Review of International Studies 37(2011):715-40

Saab,Bilal and Taylor Alexandra. Criminality and armed groups: a comparative study of FARC

and paramilitary groups in Colombia’’. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism32.6

(2009):455-75

Sanin, Guiterrez. Criminal rebels? “A discussion of civil war and criminality from the

Colombian experience.’’Politicsand Society32.2(2003): 257-85

Sanin, Guitterez, and Mauricio Baron. Restating the state: paramilitary territorial control and

political order in Colombia (1978-2004). Crisis Research Center, 2005

Shifter, Michael and Jawahar Vinay. State building in Colombia: getting priorities

straight.’’Journal of International Affairs 58.1(2004):143-54

Suarez, Alfredo. Parasites and predators: guerrillas and the insurrection economy of

Colombia.’’Journal of International Affairs53.2(2000):577-601

Sweig, Julia. What kind of war for Colombia’’. Foreign Affairs (2002), pp.122-41

Synder, Richard and Martinez Angelica. Drugs, violence and state sponsored protection rackets

in Mexico and Colombia. Colombia Internacional 70(2009):61-91

Tate, Winifred. Paramilitaries in Colombia’’. Brown Journal of World Affairs3.1 (2001).

Accessed at

http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/brownjwa8&div=22&id=

&page=

Thoumi, Francisco. Illegal drugs in Colombia: from illegal economic boom to social crisis.

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science582 (2002):102-16

Thoumi, Francisco. Illegal drugs, economy and society in the Andes. Maryland: John Hopkins

University Press, 2003

Thoumi, Francisco. Political economy & illegal drugs in Colombia. Colorado: Lynne Rienner

Publishers, 1995

Vuters, Jason and Smith Michael. A question of escalation-from counter-narcotics to counter-

terrorism: analyzing US strategy in Colombia’’. Small Wars and Insurgencies

17.2(2006):163-96

Williams, Phil. Cooperation among criminal organizations. In Mats Berdal and Monica Serrano,

Eds., transnational organized crime & international security (pp.67-80). CO: Lynne

Rienner Publishers, 2002

Place new order. It's free, fast and safe

Paper type

Deadline

Page count

550 words

Total price: $ 15.00

Our customers say

Jeff Curtis

USA, Student

"I'm fully satisfied with the essay I've just received. When I read it, I felt like it was exactly what I wanted to say, but couldn’t find the necessary words. Thank you!"

Ian McGregor

UK, Student

"I don’t know what I would do without your assistance! With your help, I met my deadline just in time and the work was very professional. I will be back in several days with another assignment!"

Shannon Williams

Canada, Student

"It was the perfect experience! I enjoyed working with my writer, he delivered my work on time and followed all the guidelines about the referencing and contents."

The effect of cocaine in colombia

Place new order. It's free, fast and safe

Our customers say

Jeff Curtis

Ian McGregor

Shannon Williams