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root in the number of choices one has on the table. It assumes that if a person makes a particular
move in a case where there was no other option to pick, at no time will the individual be held
morally accountable for the action taken. This principle brings a twist to when a person should
have the moral responsibility for the actions taken. It holds that such obligations are only
assumed when one had an option of acting otherwise.
Despite being the father of the PAP, Frankfurt came up with complicated
counterarguments to face his 1961 theory. In what is widely referred to as the Frankfurt’s
Demon, he comes up with a claim that the PAP is faulty (Blumenfeld 339). He says, “One may
be morally responsible for what he has done even though he could not have done otherwise. The
principle’s plausibility is an illusion (The Information Philosopher).” Based on this claim, Harry
developed a counterexample to the principle. Despite raising the questionability of this
principle’s credibility, the example creates a connection between free will and moral
responsibility.
In the counterexample, Frankfurt uses two gentlemen, Black and Jones. Black wishes to
have Jones carry out a particular action. Black is in dire need to see Jones take this action, and he
is ready to go an extra mile to have it done his way. However, he does not want to show he has a
hand in it. Therefore, Black holds back until there is certainty that Jones is about to make a
decision. Black makes no move not unless he is sure the other party is going to make a decision
that is contrary to what he wants. In this case, Black would take a step of doing the necessary
things at his disposal to lure Jones into doing the thing he wants him to do. Supposedly, if Black
gets to know that Jones is going to do what he wants, then Black would not take any step towards
influencing his decision. In this case, Jones is presumed to have no other alternatives. In both
cases, it should be argued that Jones has the moral responsibility for his actions. Frankfurt